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UNRAVELING THE CHICAGO/HARVARD ANTITRUST
DOUBLE HELIX:
APPLYING EVOLUTIONARY THEORY TO GUARD
COMPETITORS
AND REVIVE ANTITRUST JURY TRIALS
Thomas J. Hortont

1.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most striking and shocking antitrust paradigms in the
United States today is an extreme judicial tolerance of monopolies
and predatory conduct.! Turning Section 2 of the Sherman Ace on its

t
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2.

Associate Professor of Law and Johnson, Heidepriem & Abdallah Trial Advocacy
Fellow, The University of South Dakota School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Tom Geu, Maurice Stucke, Spencer Weber Waller, Dr. Richard Rosse, Dr. Mariano
Garcia-Blanco, Robert Lande, Robert Draba, Hays Gorey, Debra Roy, Ken Davidson,
and James Brock for their helpful comments and inspiration; and Stephannie
Bonaiuto, Teresa Carlisle, and Emily BIas for their able and assiduous efforts.
See, e.g., Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004) (defending monopoly pricing as "an important element of the free-market
system"); KENNETH M. DAVIDSON, REALITY IGNORED: How MILTON FRIEDMAN AND
CHICAGO ECONOMICS UNDERMINED AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND ENDANGERED THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY, at xviii (2011) ("[Arguing that,] [olver time,. . the concern with
undue business power as a threat to freedom [has] shifted to a concern with undue
government regulation of business as a threat to individual political freedoms.");
Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REv. 497, 498 (2009) ("The Court's view on monopolies has become forgiving.");
Spencer Weber Waller, The Past, Present, and Future of Monopolization Remedies,
76 ANTITRUST L.J. 11, 12 (2009) ("[M]onopolization cases and abuse of dominance
cases (particularly successful ones) are relatively rare birds."); Spencer Weber Waller,
The Role of Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance in Competition Law, 20 loY.
CONSUMER L. REv. 123, 124 (2008) ("In the United States, at least, it seems the
balance has tipped solidly in favor of viewing monopolies as less problematic than
cartels and similar anti competitive agreements. ").
15 U.S.c. § 2 (2006). Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every person who
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . . " Id
Possessing monopoly power by itself does not violate Section 2; a plaintiff must also
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head,3 a majority oftoday's Supreme Court views monopolies as "an
important element of the free market system" and believes that
monopoly pricing allows dominant firms to engage in "risk taking
that produces innovation and economic growth.,,4 Furthermore, this
belief is coupled with a strong antipathy toward antitrust jury trials
and an eager willingness to keep monopolization cases away from
juries. 5 Consequently, for the increasingly rare plaintiffs jury verdict
that may sneak through the expanding arsenal of judicial blockades,
such as dismissal and summary judgment, outright reversal likely
awaits. 6
How did we get to such a point? In his groundbreaking 2007
article, The Intellectual DNA of Modem Us. Competition Law for

3.

4.

5.

6.

show "the willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power as distinguished
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71
(1966). For an excellent overview of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and relevant
cases, see AM. BAR. AsS'N, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 1 ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS 225-323 (6th ed. 2007) [hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS ].
See RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETORIC,
LAW 239 (1996) ("[Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner's view that] "whenever
monopoly would increase efficiency it should be tolerated, indeed encouraged' ..
turns on its head the traditional view that competition is important both in and of
itself, as a fair, meritocratic process, and in light of a whole ensemble of expected
benefits including not only efficiency but also low prices to consumers, product
innovation, and a preference for independent entrepreneurs.") (quoting RiCHARD A.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 28 (2d ed. 2001).
Trinka, 540 U.S. at 407; see also, Stucke, supra note 1, at 498 ("[In Trinka, the Court]
surmised for the first time that charging monopoly prices is "an important element of
the free-market system,' and that monopoly pricing serves as an inducement to 'attract
[] "business acumen" in the first place' and engage in "risk taking that produces
innovation and economic growth. "') (alteration in original) (quoting Trinka, 540 U.S.
at 407).
See, e.g., DAVIDSON, supra note 1, at 85 (arguing that the Supreme Court has relied on
the alleged risks of "chilling effects," "false positives," and "wrong factual
conclusions" in antitrust cases to conclude that juries should be stripped of their
traditional fact finding functions).
See, e.g., Weyerhauser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312
(2007) (reversing jury verdict for sawmill operator against Weyerhauser for
monopolizing Pacific Northwest input market for alder sawlogs); Brooke Group, Ltd.
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (reversing plaintiff
cigarette manufacturer's jury verdict against competitor under the Robinson-Patman
Act). The government also has shown a great reluctance to file suits under Section 2
of the Sherman Act during the last ten years. See Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of
Reason Violate the Rule ofLaw?, 42 U.c. DAVIS L. REv. 1375, 1453-54 (2009).
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Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix,7 then
Federal Trade Commissioner, William E. Kovacic, traced the genesis
and development of America's current judicial tolerance for
monopolies and intolerance for antitrust jury trials. 8 Applying the
creative metaphor of a genetic double helix, 9 Commissioner Kovacic
argued that ''the intellectual DNA of U.S. antitrust doctrine governing
single-ftrm conduct today ... is chiefly a double helix that consists of
two intertwined chains of ideas, one drawn from the Chicago School
of Robert Bork, Richard Posner, and Frank Easterbrook, and the
other drawn from the Harvard School (HS) of Phillip Areeda, Donald
Turner, and Stephen Breyer."IO
7.

8.

9.

10.

William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for
Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. I (2007).
!d. at 2-16.
Commissioner Kovacic credited "Francis Crick's and James Watson's discovery of
the structure of DNA" for the "double helix imagery" used in his paper. Id at 14
n.35. See generally JAMES D. WATSON, DNA: THE SECRET OF LIFE (2003). "Genes
are sequences of DNA letters that when activated by the cell make a particular
protein." Matt Ridley, Modern Darwins, in THE BEST AMEruCAN SCIENCE AND
NATURE WruTING liS (Freeman Dysan ed., 2010). For easy-to-follow discussions of
DNA base pairs, see FRANCIS CruCK, LIFE ITSELF: ITS OruGIN AND NATURE (1981),
reprinted in THE OXFORD BOOK OF MODERN SCIENCE WRITING, 30, 31-33 (Richard
Dawkins ed., 2008) and CHARLES SEIFE, DECODING THE UNIVERSE: How THE SCIENCE
OF INFORMATION Is EXPLAINING EVERYTHING IN THE COSMOS, FROM OUR BRAINS TO
BLACK HOLES, 91-92 (2006). For an excellent analysis of how DNA works, see
Francis 1. Ayala, Molecular Evolution, in EVOLUTION: THE FIRST FOUR BILLION
YEARS 132, 150 (Michael Ruse & Joseph Travis eds., 2009). Ayala explains:
In all organisms, from bacteria to humans, the instructions that
guide the development and functioning of organisms are encased
in the same hereditary material, DNA, which provides the
instructions for the synthesis of proteins. The thousands of
diverse proteins that exist in organisms consist of the same 20
amino acids in all organisms, from bacteria to plants and to
animals. The genetic code, by which the information contained in
the DNA of the cell nucleus is passed on to proteins, is shared by
all sorts of organisms. All organisms use similar metabolic
pathways-sequences of biochemical reactions-to produce
energy and to make up the cell components.
Id.
Kovacic, supra note 7, at 13-14 (footnote omitted). Interestingly, when the two
schools have clashed, the Supreme Court generally has followed the Harvard, rather
than the Chicago School, approach. Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and
Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 1911, 1918-20 (2009) (reviewing How THE
CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008)). See generally 8 PHILLIP E.
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The fIrst ChicagolHarvard philosophical antitrust chain is built
around the idea that monopolies are generally efficient and
procompetitive. II This chain was constructed methodically by
employing Darwinian "survival of the fittest" metaphors l2 essentially
to argue that in a laissez-faire economic world, "there is struggle and
competition, and the weakest go to the walL,,13 As stated by Judge
Frank Easterbrook, "it is through the process of weeding out the
weakest firms that the economy as a whole receives the greatest
boost.,,14 The ultimate contention of this philosophical chain is that
we should be cautious about trying to apply the antitrust laws to
regulate a monopoly fIrm's size, structure, or conduct because "[t]he
cost of false positives counsels against undue expansion of § 2
liability.,,15
The second intertwined Chicago/Harvard philosophical antitrust
chain involves "cautions about the administrability of legal rules and
the capacity of the institutions entrusted with implementing
them .... "16 Under this chain, a "prominent focal point for criticism
by Areeda and Turner was the availability of jury trials in private
antitrust cases.,,17 Indeed, "[t]he inadequacies of juries constituted a
recurring justification for the restrictions that Areeda and Turner
wished to impose on the prosecution of Section Two theories of
liability.,,18 Professor Turner even "recommended that jury trials for
private cases be eliminated.,,19 He worried that antitrust issues
required "an analysis of economic and business factors beyond the

11.
12.

13.
14.
IS.

16.
17.
18.
19.

AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR ApPLICATIONS ~ 1604 (3d ed. 2010).
Kovacic, supra note 7, at 14-15. Commissioner Kovacic views this helix as
"Chicago's main contribution to the double helix." Id. at 14.
See Thomas 1. Horton, The Coming Extinction of Homo Economicus and the Eclipse
of the Chicago School of Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary Biology to Structural and
Behavioral Antitrust Analyses, 42 Loy. U. CHI. L.1. 469, 479 (2011); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REv. 645,683 (1985).
Michael Ruse, The History of Evolutionary Thought, in EVOLUTION: THE FIRST FOUR
BILLION YEARS 1, 29 (Michael Ruse & Joseph Travis eds., 2009).
Frank H. Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for
Exclusionary Conduct?, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 345, 346 (2003).
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 414
(2004). Professor Herbert Hovenkamp brilliantly has characterized such purported
concerns as "[t]he fake problem of false positives in competitor lawsuits." Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1,33 (1989).
Kovacic, supra note 7, at 14. Commissioner Kovacic considers this to be "Harvard's
main contribution to the double helix." Id.
Jd. at 53.
Jd.

Id. at 54.
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competence of most jurors,,,20 and that the use of intent standards
created "a high likelihood that jury decisions [would] be influenced
by emotional and other irrational factors. ,,21
It is time to unravel and replace the Chicago/Harvard antitrust
double helix. Building upon the evolutionary analyses in previous
papers,22 this article recommends a new philosophical antitrust double
helix that will generate increased enforcement of and compliance
with the language and spirit of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and
Section 7 of the Clayton ACt. 23 Following Commissioner Kovacic's
metaphor, a new evolutionary antitrust double helix should be built
around the genetic base pairs G-C and A_T.24 In the recommended
new evolutionary antitrust double helix, G-C bases will "guard
competitors, ,,25 and A -T bases will revive "antitrust [jury] trials. ,,26
First addressing the proposed guarding competitors ("G-C") base
pairs, the author discusses in Part II how the oft-used normative
cliche that "antitrust laws protect competition, not competitors,,27 has
20.
21.
22.

23.

24.

25.
26.
27.

Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust
Policy, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 797,813 (1987).
Id.
See Thomas 1. Horton, Competition or Monopoly? The Implications of Complexity
Science, Chaos Theory, and Evolutionary Biology for Antitrust and Competition
Policy, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 195 (2006); Horton, supra note 12.
A DNA double helix carries information that can be translated by RNA in a
transcription process to make the complex proteins of life. See Ridley, supra note 9,
at 115. Similarly, our antitrust laws are transcribed and interpreted by our antitrust
enforcers and courts to set the rules of economic competition. While recognizing that
"there is a general skeptical attitude of a large sector of the legal scholarship towards
the evolutionary approach," Mauro Zamboni, Making Evolutionary Theory Useful for
Legal Actors, in LAW, ECONOMICS, AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 270 (Peer
Zumbanson & Gralf-Peter Calliess eds., 2011), the author believes that it is time for
the antitrust enforcers and courts to begin transcribing and interpreting our antitrust
laws from a new philosophical and information template.
In DNA, the double helices are held together by hydrogen bonds between guanine
(G), which always pairs with cytosine (C); and adenine (A), which always pairs with
thymine (T). See CRICK, supra note 9, at 31-32. Thus, the alternating individual base
pairs, which collectively encode genes, are denoted as G-C or A-T.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See, e.g., ZF Meritor L.L.c. v. Eaton Corp., 769 F.Supp.2d 684, 691 (D. Del. 2011).
In a famous passage in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), Chief
Justice Warren observed that "[t]aken as a whole, the legislative history illuminates
congressional concern with the protection of competition, not competitors .... " Id at
320. For a discussion of how Harvard's Phillip Areeda selectively used the above
language to ultimately "recast the philosophy of Brown Shoe from what previously
had been seen to be a position of acute concern for the well-being of individual firms
to a position of indifference to their fate," see Kovacic, supra note 7, at 58.
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been twisted and distorted from its original benign legal use into a
dangerous indifference to the welfare of competitors and a strong bias
in favor of dominant fIrms and predatory conduct. Applying an
evolutionary analysis, this article contends that a diversity and variety
of economic competitors at all levels is crucial to a healthy economic
system. 28 Therefore, we should reform the misappropriated and
misapplied "protect competition, not competitors" cliche, and return
to protecting competition by guarding competitors against unfair and
malicious predatory conduct. 29
Turning to the proposed antitrust jury trials ("A-T") base pairs in
Part III, this article addresses how the Chicago/Harvard antitrust
double helix has been successfully employed to neutralize and negate
the issue of intent in Section 2 cases,30 and how the right to and
importance of jury trials has been overridden by anti-democratic
judicial overreaching. 3l Following evolutionary theory, this article
asserts that a jury is well-equipped to determine issues of fairness and
predatory intent in a monopolization case, and to reach a meaningful
conclusion. 32 We should therefore begin returning monopolization
cases to juries and allow jurors to fully consider evidence of intent,
purposefulness, and fairness.
II.

UNRAVELING THE CHICAGOIHARVARD APPROACH TO
DOMINANT FIRMS

The fIrst ChicagolHarvard antitrust helix boldly accepts, and even
lionizes, dominant fIrms and monopolies. 33 As explained by FTC
Commissioner Kovacic, Justices Scalia and Breyer joined forces in
the Supreme Court's 2004 Trinka decision, which includes "cautions
about the costs of wrongly condemning benign or pro competitive
conduct, warnings about the dangers of rules that would mandate
cooperation between competitors, and reminders of the institutional
limitations of antitrust tribunals. ,,34
28.
29.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See infra Part II.B.
As explained by Commissioner Kovacic, prior to the evolution of the
Chicago/Harvard antitrust double helix, American antitrust doctrine was much less
forgiving of dominant finn predatory conduct across a wide breadth of behaviors,
including predatory pricing and denying access to essential facilities. See Kovacic,
supra note 7, at 42-45.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IIl.A-C.
See Kovacic, supra note 7, at 35.
Kovacic, supra note 7, at 67 (footnotes omitted) (citing Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v.
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 392, 407-15 (2004)). Commissioner
Kovacic observes that the "majority opinion bears the name of Justice Scalia, but the

2012] Unraveling the Chicago/Harvard Antitrust Double Helix

621

The first strand of the Chicago/Harvard antitrust double helix
presumes:
[t]hat overinclusive applications of antitrust law to control
dominant firm conduct pose greater hazards to economic
performance than underinclusive applications. This
presumption assumes that the likelihood that entry and
adaptability by competitors, customers, and suppliers more
often than not will blunt dominant firm efforts to exerCIse
market power.35
This helix therefore "discourage[ s] consideration of [supposed]
non-efficiency objectives such as... the preservation of
opportunities for smaller enterprises to compete. ,,36
Fairness also is anathema under this helix. Indeed, in one passage
of their famous joint antitrust textbook, Professors Areeda and Turner
argued that "[a]s a goal of antitrust policy, 'fairness' is a vagrant
claim applied to any value that one happens to favor.,,37
It is time to reassess the philosophical presumptions of the first
ChicagolHarvard antitrust helix, which lionizes dominant firms and
monopolies and tacitly lauds and encourages predatory conduct. 38 As
stated in the Introduction, a new evolutionary antitrust model built
around the G-C base pairs should replace the outmoded and
discredited theoretical ChicagolHarvard bases. 39 The new G-C base

35.

36.
37.

38.
39.

text unmistakably is the product of a Scalia-Breyer (Chicago/Harvard)
collaboration. . .. To study the Trinka majority opinion is to see that Justice Scalia
relied heavily on Justice Breyer's ideas to state the decision's rationale." ld at 68.
Kovacic, supra note 7, at 72. To satisfy the exclusionary conduct element of Section
2 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must establish the element of "anticompetitive
conduct." Trinka, 540 U.S. at 407. The courts have long wrestled WIth the issue of
what acts constitute anticompetitive conduct, and a full discussion is beyond the scope
of this article. However, exclusionary conduct can include "vertical restrictions
limiting competitor access to customers or suppliers, denials of rivals' requests for
access, product design and new product introduction, predatory pricing, misuses of
government and standard-setting processes, and tortious conduct." ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 245; see also Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting
Antitrust, in REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY: ESSAYS ON LEGAL,
ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL POLICY 211,228-29 (Harry First et al. eds., 1991) (listing
thirteen "[s ]pecific examples of strategic behavior that is problematic").
ld at 35.
4 PHILLIP AREEDA& DONALDF. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 21 (1980).
See Kovacic, supra note 7, at 6-7 (describing the philosophical roots that spurred
insulation of and permissiveness regarding dominant firm conduct).
As noted by Kenneth M. Davidson, the Chicago/Harvard double helix's "unrealistic
and narrow view of human nature
. has led to the formulation of bad antitrust law
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pairs recommend that the best way to protect competition is to guard
competitors against unfair and predatory dominant fIrm conduct. 40
Section II.A addresses the misunderstood origins of the Supreme
Court's normative "protecting competition, not competitors"
language in Brown Shoe,4! which has been zealously invoked by the
ChicagolHarvard theoreticians to block the proper translation of our
antitrust laws. 42 The author concludes that the phrase, as currently
applied, lacks meaningful historical or statutory support. 43 Applying
an evolutionary analysis, Section II.B then discusses how diversity
and variation are natural states that allow evolution in a healthy
biological ecosystem or, by analogy, in a competitive economic
system. 44 Giantism is not natural, and monopolies are not favored in
nature. 45 We should not, therefore, favor or rationalize them
economically. Section II.C then explains how a lack of diversity in a
complex system generally results only from outside constraints,
which can include death and extinction from predation. 46 Based on
these discussions, Section II concludes that it makes evolutionary and
competitive sense to protect and promote economic diversity and
variation by guarding competitors against unfair, predatory conduct
by dominant fIrms or monopolies. 47

40.
41.

42.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

and bad public policy." DAVIDSON, supra note 1, at xiii; see also John B. Kirkwood &
Robert E. Lande, The Chicago School's Foundation Is Flawed: Antitrust Protects
Consumers, Not Efficiency, in How THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK 89,
90 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) ("[T]he Chicago School is wrong, as to both
congressional intent and to recent case law."); RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF
CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION, at xiv (2009)
(asserting that ideology driven by self-interested decisions from the business
community can distort economic policy and give rise to depression); YVES SMITH,
ECONNED: How ENLIGHTENED SELF INTEREST UNDERMINED DEMOCRACY AND
CORRUPTED CAPITALISM 93 (2010) (condemning market assumptions of neoclassical
economics); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA. FREE MARKETS, AND THE
SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 260 (2010) (attacking Chicago School economics).
See infra notes 177-178 and accompanying text.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
See Kovacic, supra note 7, at 56-59 (discussing how Harvard's Phillip Areeda recast
the antitrust-policy language of Brown Shoe from that of strong protectionism to
relative indifference).
See generally id.
See infra notes 112-121 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 115-121 and accompanying text.
See Horton, supra note 12, at 488.
See id. at 521.
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Are the Antitrust Laws Really Indifferent to Competitors?

The simple normative mantra supporting the fIrst strand of the
Chicago/Harvard antitrust double helix is that the antitrust laws
protect "competition, not competitors. ,,48 As Commissioner Kovacic
aptly notes:
The [Brunswick] decision's admonition that antitrust
protects "competition, not competitors" has become one of
the most heavily quoted aphorisms in the fIeld of
competition law. Incessant, often mechanical repetition by
commentators, corporate defendants, and public offIcials has
made it an antitrust cliche. . .. Whether one enjoys or
detests the "competition, not competitors" phrase, the
magnitude of the antitrust injury doctrine it heralded is
indisputable. 49
One need not look far to see verbatim citation after citation of this
mantra50 to support the Chicago/Harvard agenda of blessing dominant

48.
49.

50.

See Kovacic, supra note 7, at 56-58.
Id. at 60-61 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,
488 (1977); see also Harry S. Gerla, Discounters and the Antitrust Laws: Faces
Sometimes Should Make Cases, 12 J. CORP. L. 1, 34 (1986) ("[T]he saying 'the
antitrust laws protect competitors, not competition' is the leading aphorism of modern
antitrust law."); Mark E. Roszkowski, The Sad Legacy of GTE Sylvania and its "Rule
of Reason ": The Dealer Termination Cases and the Demise of Section I of the
Sherman Act, 22 CONN. L. REv. 129, 184 n.252 (1989) (quoting the relevant
"competition, not competitors" language and arguing that "[t]his unfortunate
statement has acquired a life of its own, often used to support broad statements that
the fate of individual competitors, such as small dealers or discount stores, is of no
concern to antitrust law"); Transcript, The Antitrust Marathon: A Roundtable
Discussion, Part IV: Remedies-How Far and How Much?, 20 Loy. CONSUMER. L.
REv. 197,200 (2008) (Statement of Christopher Leslie) ("Unfortunately, in the United
States, it seems to me that standing doctrine is being constrained in a way that's
reducing the viability of private enforcement. .. With competitors, you've got this
mantra of antitrust protects competition, not competitors. And some courts are
misinterpreting that to suggest antitrust doesn't protect competitors at all. There is
sometimes a lack of understanding regarding the relationship between the existence of
competitors and the process of competition.").
Recently, in a court filing in an antitrust case, the United States blithely stated that
"[t]he antitrust laws are concerned with the protection of competition, not individual
competitors." Supplemental Statement of the United States in Support of Entry of
Final Judgment at 7, United States v. Comcast Corp., No. ll-106-RJL (D.D.C. Aug.
5,2011), ECF No. 26.
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fIrms and predatory conduct. sl For example, in 2001, then Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust Charles James stated simply without
citation or support: " ... no principle is more central to U.S. law than
that antitrust protects competition, not competitors. ,,52 One would
suspect that such a compelling and seemingly fact-based mantra
would have extensive historical foundations. Indeed, the mantra
generally appears as a clear statement of fact unequivocally
supported by the legislative history of the antitrust laws. 53 Yet
citations to precise portions 0 f the antitrust laws' legislative histories
supporting the statement never seem to appear. Perhaps the simple
reason for this is that the emperor has no clothes.
The actual origins of the phrase can be seen in a pro-big business
1952 Fortune Magazine editorial titled, The New Competition and
Antitrust Policy. 54 The Fortune editorial began by lauding big
business and argued that under an economics-based antitrust policy,
"rivalry of a few large sellers [does not] necessarily mean[] economic
injustice.,,55 The editorial then turned to the Clayton Act,56 which had

51.

52.

53.
54.

55
56.

For example, in a January 31, 2003, note submitted by the United States ''under
Session I (Part of the Global Forum on Competition" held February 10-11, 2003,
the United States stated without citation:
Market competition enhances consumer welfare and promotes
an efficient allocation of society's resources because those firms
that best meet the needs of consumers with the lowest prices or
best service will prosper. It is therefore a basic principle of U.S.
antitrust law that antitrust laws should protect competition, not
competitors. The mere fact that a particular competitor is injured
by a practice does not mean that the practice is or should be
prohibited. In fact, it is inherent in the process of competition and
some firms prosper and others do not. It is the process of
competition that U.S. law protects.
OECD, THE OBJECTIVES OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY AND THE OPTIMAL DESIGN
OF A COMPETITION AGENCY 3 (2003); see also Thomas O. Barnett, Section 2
Remedies: What to Do After Catching the Tiger by the Tail, 76 ANTITRUST L. J. 31, 35
(2009) ("[C]ompetitor well-being, in itself, is not the purpose of our antitrust laws.").
Charles A. James, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't. of Justice Antitrust Div.,
International Antitrust in the 21st Century: Cooperation and Convergence (Oct. 17,
2001).
See infra text accompanying notes 70-78.
The New Competition and Antitrust Policy, FORTUNE, June 1952, reprinted in
MONOPOLY POWER AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: THE PROBLEM OF INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION 164, 164 (Edwin Mansfield ed., 1968).
Id.
15 U.S.c. § 18 (2006). Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers or acquisitions
"where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section
of the country, the effect of such acquisition .. may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." Id. For a solid overview of section 7

n
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been amended two years earlier based on "a fear of what was
considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration. ,,57 The
editorial argued:
A good case can be made for tightening up some parts of
antitrust law and enforcing it more vigorously. But an even
better case can be made for the proposition that the law
applies the classic model too literally. In general, it lacks an
economic approach to what are essentially economic
problems.
In its preoccupation with "maintaining"
competition, as ordained in the various amendments to the
Clayton Act, it has tended to produce an opposite result, i.e.,
to protect competitors from the effects of competition. 58
Despite its strong tone, the editorial did not go so far as to assert
that the purpose of the antitrust laws is "to protect competition, not
competitors. ,,59
Over the next several years, several other Fortune editorials
criticizing aggressive antitrust enforcement included variations of the
phrase. 60 For example, in a June 1957 Fortune essay, Charles E.

57.

58.
59.

60.

of the Clayton Act and relevant cases, see ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra
note 2, at 325--431.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962) ("The dominant theme
pervading congressional consideration of the [Clayton Act's] 1950 amendments was a
fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the
American economy."). See generally, e.g., 95 CONGo REc. 11500-07 (1949). For a
more extensive discussion of the legislative history of the 1950 amendments, see
Thomas 1. Horton, Fixing Merger Litigation 'Fixes ': Reforming the Litigation of
Proposed Merger Remedies Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 55 S.D. L. REv. 165,
191-94 (2010).
The New Competition and Antitrust Policy, supra note 54, at 167 (emphasis added).
Further presaging the Chicago/Harvard antitrust double helix, the 1952 Fortune
editorial concluded:
[Economic] tests place a heavy responsibility on the discretionary
powers of the authorities, and may assume more intelligence and
all-around judgment than the authorities possess. But the tests are
apt and carefully thought out, and should not be overlooked.
They or similar economic tests will have to be applied if antitrust
law is to shape competition to benefit the people whom the
creators of the classic model themselves intended it to benefit: the
consumers.
ld. at 168.
See Creeping Cartelism, u.s. Model, FORTUNE, June 1954, at 99 ("[H]ow far can the
U.S. go in protecting competitors from the effects of competition without doing away
with the competition itself?"); Does "Small Business" Get a Fair Shake?, FORTUNE,
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Silberman stated: "A fundamental paradox of American antitrust
policy ... is whether to protect competitors or competition.,,61 Mr.
Silberman did not go so far as to suggest that the legislative history of
the antitrust laws supported protecting only "competition, not
competitors." Indeed, recognizing "clear statements" to the contrary,
he stated that "some lawyers and judges question whether any law's
legislative history is relevant to its interpretation.,,62
In 1958, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Victor Hansen
picked up the phrase, but used it to support an aggressive application
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.63 After breaking up a deal that
would have given Lever Bros. Co. 21% of the detergent market, Mr.
Hansen explained that the United States was rejecting Lever's
argument that it needed the detergent brand All to better compete
against Proctor & Gamble, another industry leader. 64 Mr. Hansen
stated: "We aim to protect competition, not the competitor; to support
the process, no matter who gets hurt or who benefits.,,65
A subsequent legal adoption of the phrase appeared in a 1960 FTC
decision fmding the acquisition of Rawlings Manufacturing
Company by A. G. Spalding & Brothers, Inc. to have violated
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.66 In a decision overturning the Hearing

61.
62.

63.

64.
65.
66.

Oct. 1953, at 163, 164 ("Most of the rules of the game between businesses of different
sizes are covered by anti-monopoly laws, and other laws, such as Fair Trade and the
Robinson-Patman Act, protecting small business from rigorous competition.").
Charles E. Silberman, The Coming Assault on Bigness, FORTUNE, June 1957, at 14243.
Id. at 178. For an excellent overview of FORTUNE'S critiques of antitrust enforcement
in the 1950s and 1960s, see Tony A. Freyer, What Was Warren Court Antitrust?, 2009
SUP. CT. REv. 347, 349-59 (2010) (characterizing FORTUNE's "antitrust dialogue"
during the 1950s and 1960s as "dynamic").
See Op-Ed, Confusion in Trustbusting, TIME, July 21, 1958, at 74. At the time of
Assistant Attorney General Hansen's statement, several court opinions supporting
aggressive antitrust enforcement included iterations of the phrase. For example, in
FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957), the Supreme Court expressly stated
that Section 2(b) of the Clayton Act was "designed to protect competitors in
individual transactions." Id at 431; see also William Goldman Theatres v. Loew's,
Inc., 150 F.2d 738, 743 (3d Cir. 1945) ("We do not believe it our function to enter into
the strife of the competitive markets to protect the unfortunate. . .. But, plaintiff does
have the right to have its business protected if there is a concert of action directed at
plaintiff, which results in its removal from competition."); Pep Boys-Manny, Moe &
Jack, Inc. v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1941) ("The Commission, provided
there is a specific and substantial public interest, can protect competitors against such
methods or consumers against such acts or practices.").
Confusion in Trustbusting, supra note 63.
Id
In re A. G. Spalding & Bros., No. 6478, 1960 FTC LEXIS 219, at *88-89 (Mar. 30,
1960).
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Examiner's dismissal of the FTC's complaint, the Commission
addressed the Hearing Examiner's "plac[ing] considerable emphasis
on the fact that neither of the officials of Wilson and MacGregor [two
competitors] who had testified was questioned as to whether his
company had been adversely affected by the acquisition.,,67 Finding
that to be "an unsound basis for his conclusion," the Commission
simply stated without any legal citation or support, "The statute [Sec.
7 of the Clayton Act] refers to lessening of competition and not to
injury to competitors. Moreover, it requires only that there be a
reasonable probability that the acquisition have the proscribed effect
on competition. ,,68 Again, the phrase was used to support an
aggressive application of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 69
As often happens in the evolution of the law, however,
unsupported language appearing in one judicial context is cited as
legal precedent in a much different context. 70 The Commission's
seemingly benign phrase was thus utilized by the Brown Shoe
Company in its appeal to the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States.71 In their June 4, 1960, Brief in Opposition to Motion
to Affirm, Brown Shoe's lawyers cited the Commission's language in
a footnote to support their argument that:

67.
68.

69.

70.

71.

ld. at *87-89.
ld. at *88. The Commission added:
Even if there had been testimony that Wilson and MacGregor had
not been adversely affected, it would not alter the significant fact
that competition which formerly existed among various
manufacturers in the sale of higher priced gloves and mitts to
Spalding has been virtually eliminated by the merger.
ld.
A. G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585, 625 (3d Cir. 1962). In upholding the
Commission's decision, the Third Circuit never even mentioned the relevant
language. Instead, the Third Circuit emphasized that Section 7 of the Clayton Act
"was contrived as a preventive measure to eliminate the proscribed activities before
they became operative." Id.
Mauro Zamboni has noted how legal scholars:
can actually directly influence the choice of patterns of future
development of the law.
. For example, law professors, by
claiming the existence of a certain legal principle of efficiency
inside tort law as an established 'fact,' can actually force future
generations of law-makers and law-applying actors to introduce
this principle, even if the original claim was false.
Zamboni, supra note 23, at 278; see also Horton, supra note 57, at 171-73 (discussing
how unsupported language allowing courts to accept unilaterally proposed fixes in
merger litigation evolved and took "on a prolific [organic] life").
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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The district court directed its attention to possible effects on
certain manufacturers and retailers. However, even if the
merger would harm a particular competitor, it does not
follow automatically that "competition" will thereby be
lessened. 72
The Brown Shoe Company lawyers basically repeated this
argument in their Brief for Appellant, arguing that "it is not possible
harm to a particular competitor, but probable harm to competition,
which is criticaL,,73
Interestingly, the United States' reply brief in Brown Shoe never
directly addressed the "competition, not competitors" language cited
by Brown Shoe Company. 74 Instead, the United States argued that
the district court "did not concern itself with the effect of the merger
upon any particular competitors of Brown and Kinney to the
exclusion of others of the same class.,,75 The United States then
observed that:
[I]f appellant's point is that the judge's analysis of the
merger is deficient because he did not analyze its immediate
impact upon the other large integrated manufacturerretailers . . . the short answer is that . . . the elimination of
small competitors and the concentration of an industry into
the hands of a few large concerns as a result of stock or
asset acquisitions was exactly what Congress intended to
prevent. 76
Given the lack of compelling judicial precedent or meaningful
legislative history before the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe, it is not
surprising that the majority opinion did not cite any specific authority
(other than the broad phrase "the legislative history") the two times it
used the phrase "competition, not competitors".77 Moreover, since it
72.
73.

74.
75.
76.
77.

Brief in Opposition to Motion to Affinn at 11-12, Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294
(1962) (No.4), 1960 WL 98806 at *11-12.
Brief for Appellant at 116, Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (No.4), 1961 WL
10 1889 at * 116 (emphasis omitted). Again, the sole support cited for the argument
was the previously quoted language from the Commission's decision in A. G.
Spalding & Bros. ld.
See Brief for the United States, Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (No.4), 1961
WL 101890.
ld. at *94-95.
ld. at *95.
See Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294. As noted by Commissioner Kovacic, the Court
first used the phrase in Brown Shoe Co. when it observed: "Taken as a whole, the
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used the phrase in a strongly protectionist passage, it is impossible to
read the unanimous Court as prescribing the complete and utter
indifference to (and even disdain for) competitors that the mantra
Indeed, "the Court dismissed the view that
now connotes. 78
solicitude for the fate of individual ftrms should play no role--or
even merely a minor role-in antitrust decision-making.,,79
Furthermore, in referencing "the Act," it was clear that the Court
was discussing Section 7 of the Clayton Act and not the Sherman Act
or the antitrust laws as a whole. 80 And there is little question that the
1950 Amendments to the Clayton Act resulted from a consensus that
it was time to stem what was considered to be a frightening new

78.

79.
80.

legislative history illuminates congressional concern with the protection of
competition, not competitors, and its desire to restrain mergers only to the extent that
such combinations may tend to lessen competition." Kovacic, supra note 7, at 58
n.196 (quoting Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 320).
Later in the opinion, the Court used the phrase in discussing the importance of
promoting competition through "the protection of viable, small, locally-owned
businesses" :
A third significant aspect of this merger is that it creates a large
national chain which is integrated with a manufacturing operation.
The retail outlets of integrated companies, by eliminating
wholesalers and by increasing the volume of purchases from the
manufacturing division of the enterprise, can market their own
brands at prices below those of competing independent retailers.
Of course, some of the results of large integrated or chain
operations are beneficial to consumers. Their expansion is not
rendered unlawful by the mere fact that small independent stores
may be adversely affected. It is competition, not competitors,
which the Act protects. But we cannot fail to recognize Congress'
desire to promote competition through the protection of viable,
small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that
occasional higher costs and prices might result from the
maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved
these competing considerations in favor of decentralization. We
must give effect to that decision.
Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 344.
History and Law Professor Tony A. Freyer has chronicled the Court's Brown Shoe
decision drafting process in detail. Freyer, supra note 62, at 369-84. The phrase at
issue was not a major point of discussion or contention, and "both the activists and
moderates agreed unanimously upon an expansive reading of the Clayton Act's
section 7, overturning a controversial merger." Id at 370.
William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the
Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REv. 1413, 1424 (1990).
This reference to "the Act" is in a section of the opinion construing the 1950
amendments to Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 335, 344.
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Indeed, the Senate Report

While there may exist many differences of opinion on
other aspects of the monopoly problem, there is substantial
agreement that the level of economic concentration is
extremely high.
The enactment of the bill will limit further growth of
monopoly and thereby aid in preserving small business as an
important competitive factor in the American economy. 82
Further evidence that the Brown Shoe Court was not solely
focused on the protection of competition comes from the frrestorm of
criticism from Robert Bork and other Chicago School adherents, who
argued that the decision protected competitors, not competition. 83
Ironically, despite the strongly protectionist message of Brown
Shoe, which has been scorned by ChicagolHarvard academics like
Robert Bork,84 Brown Shoe's "competition, not competitors"
language has become the foundation for the ChicagolHarvard
antitrust double helix protecting dominant frrms and monopolies. 85
81.

82.

83.
84.

85.

See id. at 3 I 5; Derek Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and
Economics, 74 HARv. L. REv. 226,234-36 (1960); Horton, supra note 57, at 192.
S. REp. No. 81-1775 (1950), reprinted in 2 U.S. Code. Congo Service 4293, 4295
(1950); see Comment, The Amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 46 ILL. L. REv.
444,445 (1951) ("It may be stated that the purpose of the Amendment's proponents
was clearly to halt what they considered to be a rising tide of economic
concentration. ").
See, e.g., Freyer, supra note 62, at 382-84; Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr.,
The Crisis in Antitrust, FORTUNE, Dec. 1963, at 138-40, 192, 197-98,201.
See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 210
(1978) (criticizing Brown Shoe as "the worst antitrust essay ever written"); Robert H.
Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 363, 373
(1965).
Much of the application of the cliche has appeared in the context of erecting antitrust
injury and standing barriers to efforts by competitors of monopolists or dominant
firms to pursue Section 2 cases. For an excellent discussion of the evolution of the
antitrust injury concept, which is beyond the scope of this article, see William H.
Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust
Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REv. 1221 (1989). For several strong
criticisms of the antitrust injury and standing doctrines as door closing devices to
thwart private remedies, see John 1. Gibbons, Antitrust, Law & Economics, and
Politics, 50 L. & CONT. PROBLS. 217,221-22 (1987); s. Sussman, Business Judgment
vs. Antitrust Justice, 76 GEO. L.1. 337,344 (1987). In the words of Judge Gibbons,
"[i]t is one thing, however, to overrule a demonstrably erroneous substantive
interpretation of an open-textured statute. It is quite another to attempt to repeal a
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This stunning mutation and organic metamorphosis from a normative
statement of opinion in a 1952 Fortune editorial to the bedrock
foundation of ChicagolHarvard competition philosophy and current
American antitrust jurisprudence is well-chronicled by Commissioner
Kovacic. 86 In 1976, fourteen years after Brown Shoe, Harvard
Professor Phillip Areeda authored a thirteen-page law review
comment 8? addressing two upcoming Supreme Court decisions:
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 88 and United States
Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. 89 As Commissioner Kovacic
recounts, Professor Areeda's article selectively quoted the Brown
Shoe "competition, not competitors" language, and sought to "recast
the philosophy of Brown Shoe from what previously had been seen to
be a position of acute concern for the well-being of individual fIrms
to a position of indifference to their fate.,,9o
The rest is history. As aptly noted by Commissioner Kovacic,
"[t]he Supreme Court in Brunswick replicated the subtle, significant
reinterpretation of Brown Shoe that Areeda had undertaken in his law
review comment.,,91 Worse yet, selectively citing only the fIrst
"competition, not competitors" phrase from Brown Shoe, and no
other support, the Supreme Court ascribed the phrase not to Section 7
of the Clayton Act, but to the antitrust laws generally!92 Suddenly,
the antitrust laws as a whole protected only competition, not
competitors.93 From such a thin evolutionary mutation, a judicial
counterrevolution metastasized. 94
Today, many of the most reasonable commentators and enforcers
seem to be seduced by the Chicago/Harvard rhetoric that by
justifying monopolies and dominant fIrms, one strikes a blow for

86.
87.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

statute by the judicial invention of procedural barriers to its enforcement." Gibbons,
supra, at 222.
See Kovacic, supra note 7, at 71-73; Kovacic, supra note 79, at 1415.
Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1127 (1976).
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
Kovacic, supra note 7, at 56,58.
Id. at 59.
Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488; Kovacic, supra note 7, at 56-58.
See BORK, supra note 84, at 203-04. Robert Bork characterized the protection of
small business as an "ancient and disreputable" theory of antitrust. Id. at 203.
For a discussion of "[t]he powerful impact upon private antitrust litigation of the
doctrine of Brunswick," see Kovacic, supra note 7, at 59 n.200; Joseph P. Bauer, The
Stealth Assault on Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the Barriers for Antitrust Injury
and Standing, 62 U. PIrro L. REv. 437 (2001).
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economic efficiencies and free markets. 95 Meanwhile, federal courts
never seem to tire of citing Brown Shoe and Brunswick for the broad
proposition that the antitrust laws were "enacted to protect
competition, not competitors.,,96 Ironically, the courts never seem
concerned that their broad normative statements about "the antitrust
laws" might be historically inconsistent with the "legislative history
leading to the enacting of the Sherman Act and [with] the amendment
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act in 1950 showing that Congress was
concerned with the disappearance of small independent entrepreneurs
and their displacement by massive corporations.,,97 As is wellchronicled by Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, the legislative history
of the Sherman Act strongly suggests that "everyone agreed that
competitors should be entitled to sue," and that "[a]lthough the
drafters of the Sherman Act were concerned about injury to
consumers, they were at least as concerned with various kinds of
injury to competitors.,,98 As Professor Hovenkamp concluded:
"Competitors were the principal protected class of the Sherman
Act.,,99

95.

96.

97.
98.
99.

See Kovacic, supra note 7, at 59, 67, 70-73, 80; Robert F. Pitofsky, The Political
Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 1058 (1979). No serious commentator,
including this author, contends that inefficient small businesses should be protected
against the rigors of fair competition. But predatory conduct by monopolists and
dominant firms is a much different matter. Professor Pitofsky presents an objective
view of the debate and concludes:
Such considerations as the fear that excessive concentration of
economic power will foster antidemocratic political pressures, the
desire to reduce the range of private discretion by a few in order
to enhance individual freedom, and the fear that increased
governmental intrusion will become necessary if the economy is
dominated by the few, can and should be feasibly incorporated
into the antitrust equation.
Id. at 1075.
See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 906 (2007);
Atlanta Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338 (1990); Warrior
Sports, Inc. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 623 F.3d 281, 286 (6th Cir. 2010);
Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 76 (3d Cir. 2010);
Jebaco, Inc. v. Harrah's Operating Co., 587 F.3d 314, 320 (5th Cir. 2009); Reudy v.
Clear Channel Outdoors, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Wood v.
Archbold Med. Ctr, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1364-65 (M.D. Ga. 2010); Fido's
Fences, Inc. v. Canine Fence Co., 672 F. Supp. 2d 303, 309 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
Pitofsky, supra note 95, at 1058-59; see Kovacic, supra note 7, at 80-81.
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1, 23-24
(1989).
Jd. at 29. Professor Hovenkamp included detailed summaries of the Sherman Act's
legislative history expressing "concern with competitor injuries." Id. at 44-46; see
also Andreas Koutsoudakis, Antitrust More Than a Century After Sherman: Why
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The courts also do not explain their views in light of the 1936
passage of the Robinson-Patman Ace oo and the continued
congressional refusals to repeal it. 101 As noted by Professor Andrew
I. Gavil in Sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act, "concern for the fate
of individual 'competitors' is unambiguous, albeit on the assumption
that as goes the fate of competitors, so goes the fate of
competition.,,102 Is it really so hard to believe that the antitrust laws'
framers recognized that competition and competitors had to be
protected against unfair and predatory conduct by monopolies and
dominant firms?103
Another point that seems to get lost in the obsessive deference to
the "competition, not competitors" cliche is that Professor Areeda
never condoned "anticompetitive activity" by dominant fIrms, 104
although he came perilously close to blessing anticompetitive
acquisitions. 105 Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in Cargill, Inc. v.
Protecting Competitors Promotes Competition More Than Economically Efficient
Mergers, 34 U. DAYTON L. REv. 223, 230 (2009) ("[P]rotecting competitors is one
100.

101.

102.

103.

104.

105.

main purpose for which Congress enacted antitrust legislation.").
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.c. §§ 13, 21a (1936). The Robinson-Patman Act
currently is the principal federal statute directed at price discrimination. A detailed
discussion of the Act's six basic provisions is beyond the scope of this article.
However, the first provision generally "prohibits a seller from discriminating in price
between different buyers when the discrimination adversely affects competition." The
second provision then "establishes an affirmative defense if the discrimination arises
from meeting competition." ANTITRUST LA W DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 483.
See, e.g., DAVIDSON, supra note 1, at 53 (2011) ("Congress, confident in the virtue of
its intent and responding to the continuing claims by smaller businesses that they need
protection from the economic power of larger businesses, has steadfastly refused to
amend or abolish the law. ").
Andrew I. Gavil, Secondary Line Price Discrimination and the Fate of Morton Salt:
To Save It, Let It Go, 48 EMORY L.1. 1057, 1118 (1999); see also FTC v. Nat'l Lead
Co., 352 U.S. 419, 431 (1957) (holding that Section 2(b) of the Clayton Act
"protect[s] competitors in individual transactions").
See, e.g., F. M. Scherer, Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat from the Chaff, 86
YALE L.J. 974, 981 (1977) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976» ("[I]f the courts have strayed beyond the bounds of
the efficiency criterion [the Chicago/Harvard philosophy] considers so important, and
if this is not what Congress wants, one wonders why Congress has not intervened.").
Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1127, 1134 (1976). In a 1976 law review article, Professor Areeda expressly stated
that "as long as there is no anti competitive injury, the fact of injury to a competitor is
not a concern of the antitrust laws." Id
See, e.g., 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATIONS 24-29 (1978) ("The arbitrary
preservation of a few firms here or there cannot contribute significantly to the
dispersion of power or to the protection of political democracy.").
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Monfort of Colorado, went out of its way to note that "Brunswick
ho Ids that the antitrust laws do not require the courts to protect small
businesses from the loss of profits due to continued competition, but
only against the loss of profits from practices forbidden by the
antitrust laws. ,,106
Even if the cliche that the "antitrust laws protect competition, not
competitors" had more historical or legislative support than the
flimsy reed it was built upon, should we further leverage the mantra
to essentially immunize dominant firms and monopolies from
Sherman Act Section 2 liability or greatly decrease the reach of
Clayton Act Section 7?
A small but growing number of
commentators believe that the answer is no.107 For example, Michael
Ferrill, Leslie Hyman, and Caleb Rackley argue that "there can be no
competition without competitors, and it often is the case that a
competitor is the market participant most likely to recognize and have
the incentive to challenge conduct that threatens the competitive
process.,,108 As is discussed in Sections Band C below, evolutionary
theory supports these critics' position.
106. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., 479 U.S. 104, 116 (1986) (emphasis added).
107. See, e.g., Louis B. Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust,
127 U. PA. L. REv. 1076, 1076 (1979) ("I would not yield .. to the dogma that the
antitrust laws protect 'competition not competitors,' because the goals of justice and
the antitrust laws sometimes demand protection of competitors."). Schwartz further
argued that we should amend the phrase to include "unless individual competitors
must be protected in the interests of preserving competition." Id. at 1078; see also
John 1. Flynn & James F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of
Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the
Resolution of Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1125, 1126 nA (1987) ("The
cliche implicitly asserts that one can have competition without competitors, contains
no definition of . competition, ' and is frequently used to deny the congressionally
defined goals of antitrust policy in favor of the narrow goals assumed by the
neoclassical model."); Dimitri Giotakos, GE/Honeywell: A Theoretic Bundle
Assessing Conglomerate Mergers Across the Atlantic, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L. ECON. L.
469,498 (2002) ("Where competitors are squeezed out, marginalized or driven out of
the market, they cannot oppose any credible competitive constraint to the dominant
merged firms."); Bryce 1. Jones, Maximum Vertical Price Fixing: Making the Rule
"Right ", 17 MIDWEST L. REv. 69, 83 (2000) (criticizing the quote "that antitrust is
designed to protect competition, not competitors").
108. A. Michael Ferrill et ai., Antitrust and Consumer Protection, 62 SMU L. REv. 855,
875 (2009). The authors add:
Brunswick does not imply a necessary conflict between the
goals of protecting competition and protecting competitors, but
rather instructs antitrust courts to be alert to the possibility that
such a conflict may be present in individual cases. Nonetheless, it
has become fashionable for antitrust cognoscenti to single out for
disapprobation antitrust claims brought by a competitor of the
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Increasing Variation and Diversity Are Natural States

This author previously has discussed in detail why evolutionary
theory has much to teach us about antitrust regulation in our complex,
free-market economy. 109 Indeed, "[e]conomists have long been
fascinated by evolutionary and biological competition theories." 110
Evolutionary biology has a great deal to offer us concerning the
importance of variation, diversity, and complexity in competitive
economic systems. III
Increasing variation, diversity, and complexity are natural states. 112
"[NJatural selection requires variation in order to effect change." 113

109.
110.

111.

112.

defendant. Antitrust scholars of a certain disposition argue that
competitors should be foreclosed from bringing antitrust claims,
while others draw upon the same scholarship to argue that the
private antitrust remedy be abolished. And then there are those
who take laissez faire theology to its logical conclusion, insisting
that the antitrust laws be repealed altogether.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Edward T. Swaine, "Competition, Not Competitors, "
Nor Canards: Ways o/Criticizing the Commission, 23 U. PA. J.INT'L. ECON. L. 597,
625 (2002) ("At the same time, competitors may provide probative information that
consumers lack the incentive or ability to obtain, or that otherwise would be
prohibitively difficult for the agency to obtain on its own."). But see POSNER. supra
note 3, at 280-82 (advocating that the states be stripped of their authority to bring
antitrust suits save in defense of their own proprietary interests, in part because "they
are excessively influenced by interest groups that may represent a potential antitrust
defendant's competitors").
See Horton, supra note 12, at 469-71, 477-84; Horton, Competition or Monopoly?,
supra note 22, at 197-201.
Horton, supra note 12, at 477; see also ERIC D. BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH:
EVOLUTION, COMPLEXITY, AND THE RADICAL REMAKING OF ECONOMICS 187 (2006)
("Businesspeople, journalists, and academics all gravitate quite naturally to using
images of ecosystems and evolution when they speak about the economy. ").
See BERT HOLLDOBLER & EDWARD O. WILSON, THE ANTS 395 (1990) (observing that
intense head-to-head competition in natural ecosystems results in "the diversification
of closely related species occupying the same locality"); GEERAT 1. VERMEIJ, NATURE:
AN ECONOMIC HISTORY 3-4 (2009) ("[T]he human species and the human economy
do not differ fundamentally from units encountered in the rest of the biosphere."); id.
at 170 ("[E]conomic spatial divisions of the world, whether they be forests and fields
of nature or the nations of human civilization, result from competition and the
responses of living things to it.").
DANIEL W. MCSHEA & ROBERT N. BRANDON, BIOLOGY'S FIRST LAW: THE TENDENCY
FOR DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY TO INCREASE IN EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS 3 (20l0);
see also WILLIAM D. CASEBEER, NATURAL ETHICAL FACTS: EVOLUTION,
CONNECTIONISM, AND MORAL COGNITION 150 (2003) ("[V]ariation among population
of species members is something to be expected and something that modem synthesis
successfully explains. ").
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At all biological levels, long-tenn health and stability are augmented
by variation,114 which is the essence of diversity. 115 Healthy species
therefore consist "not of solely the fittest genome but instead of a
distribution of genomes in a mutation-selection balance.,,116 Living
ecosystems therefore "are organized for functions that at least
incidentally maintain diversity and productivity .... "117 Biological
studies increasingly show that variation within species and
populations is both common and adaptive. 118 The "long-tenn value"
of diversity is coming to be understood as more than political
correctness. 119 Instead, it is part of a long-tenn adaptability and
survivability portfolio. l2O Indeed, ecological diversity is viewed as a
"yardstick of biological success."l2l
The astonishing array of natural diversity is built around an
"unexpected and startling degree of order.,,122 Such order is
inevitable, since nature is limited by a host of physical and chemical
constraints. 123 One of nature's most fundamental limitations is
113. Egbert Giles Leigh, Jr., Adaptation, Adaptationism and Optimality, in
AoAPTATlONISM AND OPTIMALITY 358, 362 (Steven Hecht Orzack & Elliott Sober
eds., 2001); see also MARTIN A. NOWAK, EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS: EXPLORING THE
EQUATIONS OF LIFE 24 (2006) ("[V]ariability [is] needed for natural selection. If
variabIlity disappears, then natural selection has nothing upon which to act.").
114. James E. Lovelock, The Earth as a Living Organism, in BIODIVERSITY 486, 488
(Edward O. Wilson ed., 1988); Horton, supra note 13, at 488 and citations therein.
115. MCSHEA & BRANDON, supra note 112, at 26.
116. NOWAK, EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS, supra note 113, at 42. Nowak additionally
observes that it is possible that the broad distribution of genomes "does not contain
the fittest genome at all. Hence 'survival of the fittest' is replaced by 'survival of the
quasispeci.es.'" Id Therefore, "[i]n principle, evolutionary biology can account for
the amazing diversity and astonishing complexity oflife." Id at 292.
117. Leigh, supra note 116, at 363 (emphasis omitted).
118. Kenneth 1. Halama & David N. Reznick Adaptation, Optimality, and the Meaning of
Phenotypic Variation in Natural Populations, in AoAPTATlONISM, supra note 116, at
242,242-43,263-64.
119. JOAN ROUGHGARDEN, THE GENIAL GENE: DECONSTRUCTING DARWINIAN SELFISHNESS
84 (2009).
120. Id.
121. MICHAEL RUSE, DARWINISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS 199 (2006) (quoting KARL J.
NIKLAS, THE EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY OF PLANTS 204-05 (1997».
122. BRIAN GOODWIN, How THE LEOPARD CHANGED ITS SPOTS: THE EVOLUTION OF
COMPLEXITY 117 (1994). For example, "[d]espite the profusion of leaf shapes in
higher plants, there are basically only three ways in which leaves are arranged on a
stem." Id Thus, "it appears that the different patterns are not fixed characteristics of
different species but are a set of alternative states available to the leaf-generating
process in the meristem." Id at 119.
123. Id at 135-42. Biologist Brian Goodwin further hypothesizes that "what we see in
evolution may be primarily an emergence of states generic to the dynamics of living
systems." Id. at 186.
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physical size. "For every type of animal there is a most convenient
size, and a large change in size inevitably carries with it a change of
form.,,124 The evolution of body forms therefore seems to follow
"some fairly predictable rules common to all forms of life .... ,,125
The Chicago/Harvard notion of ever-increasing economies of
scale driven by increases in size l26 is inconsistent with nature. In
nature, as organisms get larger and larger, they face a host of natural
straitjackets that "impose considerable anatomical and physiological
diseconomies of scale on their large-bodied carriers.,,127 Thus, as
previously noted, giantism is not a natural state.
Nor is nature generally optimal or efficient in the classical
economic sense preached by the Chicago/Harvard proponents. 128
"[NJature and evolution consistently build seemingly inefficient
structural, physiological, and chemical redundancies into living
systems at all levels as a means of ensuring increased flexibility,
adaptability, and stability.,,129 For example, approximately "ninetyseven per cent of our genome does not consist of true genes at all. It
consists of a menagerie of strange entities ... collectively known as
'junk DNA' .... ,,130 This is not as surprising as it may seem because
biological systems are essentially
"information-processing
machines,,,131
and
"[iJnformation
and
redundancy
are
complementary .... "132 Indeed, redundancies and loosely connected

124.

125.

126.
127.

128.
129.
130.

131.
132.

J. B. S. Haldane, On Being the Right Size, In THE OXFORD BOOK OF MODERN SCIENCE
WRITING 53, 54 (Richard Dawkins ed., 2008). Haldane adds that "it is easy to show
that a hare could not be as large as a hippopotamus, or a whale as small as a herring."
ld. at 54. Similar limitations exist for organs. For example, "the eye is a rather
inefficient organ until it reaches a large size." ld. at 58.
HAIM OFEK, SECOND NATURE: ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF HUMAN EVOLUTION 91 (20001).
Discussing economies of scale related to size, Ofek adds that "(e]ngineers therefore
are faced with a delicate balancing act between economies of scale in surface or
diseconomies of scale in weight or, more fundamentally, between an invariable law of
solid geometry and the law of gravity." ld.
See supra text accompanying notes 11-15 (discussing the Chicago/Harvard argument
that monopolies efficiently weed out weaker firms and allow the economy to grow).
OFEK, supra note 125, at 92.
See, e.g., RUSE, DARWINISM, supra note 121, at 136-39.
Horton, supra note 12, at 490 (footnote omitted) (citing Joseph Farrell, Complexity,
Diversity, and Antitrust, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 165, 167-68 (2006)).
MATT RIDLEY, GENOME: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A SPECIES IN 23 CHAPTERS 123-24
(2010); see also Horton, supra note 13, at 490-91 (discussing how junk DNA and
genetic redundancies help strengthen an organism by promoting adaptability).
Sydney Brenner, Theoretical Biology in the Third Millennium, in MODERN SCIENCE
WRITING, supra note 9, at 40,44.
SEIFE, supra note 9, at 13. Seife adds:
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interdependencies help avoid complexity catastrophes if one part of a
system breaks down or is injured. 133
Ecological and genetic redundancies also provide a cornucopia of
variety for natural selection to act upon 134 in producing new or
different fitness adaptations. 135 As noted by economist Haim Ofek,
"[B]iological arms races, as exemplified by the stature of forest trees
(and, arguably, by the human brain) are bound to reveal new
unintended applications which can be put to good use.,,136 Indeed, "a
rich metabolism of diverse reactions [is a] basic characteristic of
living systems.,,13? In other words, nature is masterful at exploiting
diversity and variety to create new innovations.
Through both instinctual and experiential learning, humans have
come to make diversity "the central organizing principle of human
consumption." 138 Our human economies mimic nature in requiring
high levels of diversity for long-term health and stability.139 Thus, a
Computer scientists are well aware of the redundancy ina
stream of bits and bytes for two main reasons. The first is error
correction. Humans make mistakes when entering long strings of
numbers, so credit cards, serial numbers, bar codes, and numerous
other numbers are padded with redundancy so that a computer
will be able to detect whether someone has made a data-entry
error ....

133.
134.

135.
136.
137.

138.

139.

. .. English and other human languages [also] have a great
deal of redundancy built into them.
Jd. at 69-70.
See, e.g., Horton, supra note 12, at 491 (citing BEINHOCKER, supra note 110, at 15052).
"[N]atural selection operates on the variation in shapes and sizes and forms of
organisms created by mutations in their genes
.. " Ruse & Travis, Introduction, in
EVOLUTION: THE FIRST FOUR BILLION YEARS, supra note 9, at x. Of course, "natural
selection is not the only important evolutionary force." Id. Other forces can include
genetic drift, sexual selection, and chance. Ptacek & Hankison, The Pattern and
Process o/Speciation, in EVOLUTION: THE FIRST FOUR BILLION YEARS, supra note 10,
at 177.
In the words of Matt Ridley, "Welcome to pleiotropy and pluralism." RIDLEY, supra
note 130, at 66. As Ridley further notes: "[G]enes are messy." Id.
OFEK, supra note 125, at 82.
GOODWIN, supra note 122, at 188; see also MCSHEA & BRANDON, supra note 112, at
42 ("[S]election works by favoring lineages that are more evolutionarily responsive to
environmental changes, those that can be modified independently from other lineages,
freed from the historical constraints that otherwise limit morphological evolution.").
OFEK, supra note 125, at 64.
See GOODWIN, supra note 122, at 230 ("[W]hen all the multiple yields of diverse
crops, the values and outputs of biological systems, are taken in account, agricultural
practices based on diversity are more productive, produce higher nutrient value in the
food than monoculture farming, and are sustainable.
And there are countless
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"key to human health and sheer existence is diversity in food
intake.,,140
Similarly, in the economic fields of corporate governance and
finance, "a diversity oflocal response[s] is a sign of health; ifthere is
a major crisis, it will be disastrous if the solutions have been uniform
and universal .... ,,141 Hopefully, we learned that in the wake of the
recent banking and financial crisis.142 Despite Judge Bork's verbal
attacks against Justice Brandeis and his alleged "lack of conceptual
clarity,,,143 perhaps Justice Brandeis had it right all along in theorizing
that "[t]here are no natural monopolies today in the industrial
world."I44 Instead, nature favors variety, diversity, and complexity. 145

140.

141.

142.

143.
144.

145.

other instances that contrast the monoculture mentality of 'scientific' Western
Agriculture with the robust, supportive, diverse, and sustainable qualities of
traditional agroforestry. "); Horton, supra note I 2, at 489.
OFEK, supra note 125, at 63. For example, "[t]hough the most conspicuous, scurvy is
only one of a long list of nutritional disorders associated with lack of diversity in food
consumption." Id
MARC GOERGEN ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COMPLEXITY THEORY 79
(2010). The authors add that "[i]f there is local diversity, there are multiple
microstrategies already tried out and some of them are likely to fit the new
environmental conditions." Id; see also Joseph Farrell, Complexity, Diversity, and
Antitrust, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 165, 167-68 (2006) (discussing benefits of "multiple
approaches" by "multiple organizations" to economic issues); Grant Miles et aI.,
Industry Variety and Performance, 14 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 163, 166-72 (1993)
(discussing a study finding a positive correlation between industry variety and
performance); Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust's Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV.
551,613 (2012) ("A low to moderately concentrated industry with diverse competitors
can offer greater benefits ... than a highly concentrated industry. ").
See "Too Big to Fail? ": The Role of Antltrust Law in Government-Funded
Consolidation in the Banking Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts &
Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Illth Congo 10 (2009)
(statement of Albert A. Foer, PreSident, Am. Antitrust Inst.) (discussing how failures
of large organizations deeply embedded in the economy cause huge ripple effects
throughout the system); JOSEPH STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND
THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010); ANDREW Ross SORKIN, Too BIG TO
FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF How WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM-AND THEMSELVES (2009).
See, e.g., BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 84, at 42.
Louis D. Brandeis, Shall We Abandon the Policy of Competition?, in THE CURSE OF
BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 104, 105 (Osmond K.
Frankel ed., 1934); see also Horton, supra note 12, at 486, n.78; Horton, supra note
22, at 205-13.
More and more economists are coming to accept that competitive economic diversity
provides substantial economic innovation and variety benefits. See WALTER ADAMS
& JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX: INDUSTRY, LABOR, AND GOVERNMENT IN
THE AMERlCAN ECONOMY 59-62 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing economic studies showing
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When Diversity and Complexity Are Diminishing, We Should
Look for Outside Constraints, Including Predatory Behavior by
Dominant Firms and Anticompetitive Mergers

Increasing variety, diversity, and complexity are natural. So why
are monopolies and dominant fIrms so prevalent?146 Duke University
Professors McShea and Brandon counsel that when diversity and
complexity are diminishing rather than increasing, we should look for
unnatural outside limits or constraints being imposed upon the
system. 147 They further argue that most of the possible outside
factors such as "limits on heredity" and "selection against diversity"
probably do not limit diversity much. 148 "[DJeath and extinction," on
the other hand "have the potential to be serious drains on
diversity." 149
Could this explain the unremitting efforts of
monopolists and dominant fIrms to "try to eliminate the competition
from their own ranks, sometimes to the point of cut-throat price
wars,,,ISO or the temptations to acquire aggressive competitors?
The Chicago/Harvard antitrust philosophy counsels that predatory
behavior is not to be feared because it allegedly rarely occurs. lSI
Judge Easterbrook, for example, has stated, without citation or
meaningful legal support, that a predator "is highly sensitive to its
costs of doing business; it calculates how much sacrifIce it needs to

146.

147.
148.
149.
ISO.
lSI.

how high economic concentration retards technological innovation and development);
Michael E. Porter, Competition and Antitrust: A Productivity Approach, in UNIQUE
VALUE: COMPETITION BASED ON INNOVATION CREATING UNIQUE VALUE 161-65
(Charles D. Weller et al. eds., 2004); MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 662-69 (1990); Farrell, supra note 141, at 167-68.
See ADAMS & BROCK, supra note 145, at 124 ("[W]hile the shape of the monopoly
problem has changed, the nature of the problem persists."); BARRY C. LYNN,
CORNERED: THE NEW MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION
16 (2010) ('''We are in an age of monopolies."') (quoting Jim Cramer, MSNBC, Feb.
15, 2006); TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA: THE RISE OF CORPORATE POWER AND THE
DISABLING OF DEMOCRACY 82 (2005) (discussing the "rapidly accelerating trend to
concentration" as a result of a "lenient policy on mergers").
See MCSHEA & BRANDON, supra note 112, at 29.
ld. at 29-33.
Jd. at 32. McShea and Brandon further note that "[i]n extreme cases, reductions in
diversity due to extinction have been dramatic." ld.
OFEK, supra note 125, at 139.
See DAVIDSON, supra note I, at 85 (observing that, for the Chicago School,
"[pJredation is not plausible because theory [allegedly] has shown that it is unlikely to
occur"); Eleanor Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Retrospective and Prospective: Where
Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, in REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS
SECOND CENTURY: ESSAYS ON LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL POLICY 73, 74
(Harry First et al. eds., 1991).
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make (and could bear), and uses that as the basis of its prices.,,152
Moreover, consumers allegedly benefit from predatory conduct, such
as predatory pricing, because "[ t]he success of any predatory scheme
depends on maintaining monopoly power for long enough both to
recoup the predator's losses and to harvest some additional gain,,,153
and "[p]ersistent entry and expansion by other firms at the same time
[generally] ensures that recoupment cannot occur.,,154
Such conclusory economic cliches rationalizing and encouraging
predatory conduce 55 completely fail to account for the simple point
that throughout our evolutionary history, humans' most deadly
predators have been other human beings.156 It is part of our

152. A. A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir.
1989).
153. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986).
154. A. A. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1403.
155. Such conclusions seem tantamount to arguing that we should not worry about an
opposing baseball pitcher purposely throwing at a player's head because the pitcher
knows that even if he knocks that player out of the game, someone will come off the
bench and replace him. Meanwhile, the fans will ultimately benefit from the super
aggressive competition. Similarly, the National Football League should stop worrying
about vicious hits that injure or cripple players because spectators will benefit from
the increased aggressiveness.
The Chicago/Harvard school may argue that these examples involve successful
predation, as opposed to most economic predation, which generally is unsuccessful
and therefore unprofitable. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 595; A. A. Poultry Farms, 881
F.2d at 1401.
How exactly does a predator know, however, whether its vicious predation will be
unsuccessful in the long-term, especially when it can enjoy the short-term benefits and
satisfaction of knowing it successfully destroyed a hated competitor? And why do not
all criminals carefully calculate the economic benefits versus potential losses before
engaging in vicious and destructive aggression? Recently deceased antitrust giant
Alfred E. Kahn observed that "[t]he burden surely rests on the critics of the antitrust
laws to demonstrate that those predatory or collusive actions which the law attacks are
indeed requisite to good performance. This is something for the most part they have
failed to do." Alfred E. Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Policy, in MONOPOLY POWER
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, supra note 54, at 169, 178. Economist Oliver
Williamson similarly has argued that "[e]fforts to derogate strategic behavior have
been
overdone," and we need to "taken strategic behavior in all its forms
seriously." Williamson, supra note 38, at 236-37.
156. PAUL SEABRIGHT, THE COMPANY OF STRANGERS: A NATURAL HISTORY OF ECONOMIC
LIFE 8 (2010); see also DAVIDSON, supra note 1, at 86 (,,[T]he notion that businesses
do not engage in predatory pricing or predation in general is silly and is a conclusion
that could only be deduced from theory, not from experience or observation of life. It
is too obvious and too trite to dwell on the fact that aggressive behavior is often an
effective means of eliminating and deterring competitors, whether one is talking about
stags fighting over a doe, bullies dominating a schoolyard, or monopolists or cartels
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evolutionary nature to be "strongly disposed against unrelated
individuals in the appropriate circumstances,,157-some would argue
to the point that we have an "innate murderousness." 158 Economist
Paul Seabright, for example, points to the "sobering" historical record
showing that ''where there are no institutional restraints on it,
systematic killing of unrelated individuals is so common among
human beings that, awful though it is, it cannot be described as
exceptional, pathological, or disturbed." 159 Economist Michael
Shermer attributes "evil to our dual dispositional nature and the fact
that in addition to being trusting, cooperative, and altruistic, we are
also distrusting, competitive, and selfish .... "160
Given our innate predatory and aggressive instincts, not to
mention the history of war, is it really so hard to believe that
businesses might be inclined to engage in unfair and predatory
conduct designed to eliminate a competitor? "Military strategists
have long known that a disparity in strength between rivals-and
especially a growing disparity in strength-is the most important
single reason to expect an outbreak of hostilities.,,161 Thus, our
propensity to engage in cooperative commercial activity "has always
coexisted with a rival temptation to take, bully, and extort.,,162 Could
that be one reason why hostile takeovers are so common even though
evidence "suggests that the shareholders of bidders involved in
hostile takeovers feel that such transactions destroy shareholder
wealth. [And] there is little evidence ... of the disciplining role of
hostile takeoversT 163

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

163.

disciplining price cutters."); Horton, supra note 12, at 509 (discussing humans' innate
biological propensities for potential viciousness, aggression, and irrationality that
constitute our darker side).
SEABRIGHT, supra note 156, at 59.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 61.
MICHAEL SHERMER, THE MIND OF THE MARKET: COMPASSIONATE APES, COMPETITIVE
HUMANS, AND OTHER TALES FROM EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS 184 (2008).
SEABRIGHT, supra note 159, at 280.
Id. at 288. Professor Seabright characterizes this as "the fragility of the commercial
motive in the face of more brutal temptations." Id
GOERGEN ET AL., supra note 141, at 76-77. The Chicago/Harvard philosophy, on the
other hand, is that promoting mergers is "the way markets regulate inefficient
corporate managers." DAVIDSON, supra note 1, at 71. Indeed, Chicago School
advocate Michael Jensen went so far as to argue that "the benefits of mergers was to
discipline acquiring firms by stripping them of inefficiently used money, free cash
flow and credit by payments to the shareholders of the acquired firm. Thereafter, the
acquiring firm, stripped of the acquisition resources, would be more subject to market
resources." Id at 72.
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Unfortunately, today's laissez-faire business environment, which
is a key component of the Chicago/Harvard antitrust philosophy,
helps foster an "us versus them" mentality that plays into our
evolutionary heritage of "violence between groups, whose individuals
cooperate among themselves to inflict violence more lethally and
cruelly than they ever could do on their own." 164 Therefore, we
should not be shocked that business environments can shape and
promote managerial agents who are potential agents of corruption,
and predatory attacks against competitors. 165 In the words of Michael
Shermer:
When order breaks down, when the rules are no longer
enforced, when the normal institutional brakes on evil are
lifted, evil is facilitated through the contagious excitement
of the group's actions, through the unchecked momentum of
the smaller bad steps that came before, and ultimately
permission for evil is granted by the system at large. 166
This is especially likely when corporations are interested in shortterm profits and market shares. 167
It is time, therefore, to start taking seriously again the notion that
the destruction of competitors by dominant-fum predatory conduct
and aggressive mergers are harmful external constraints on the
natural growth of economic variation, diversity, and complexity. The
164. SEABRIGHT, supra note 156, at 290.
165. GOERGEN ET AL., supra note 141, at 93-94. As added by Philosophy Professor
William D. Casebeer: "Simply put, your environment counts, and it counts for a lot."
CASEBEER, supra note 112, at 110. Casebeer goes on to describe "morality as an
essentially ecological evolutionary phenomenon." Id.
166. SHERMER, supra note 160, at 213. Shermer additionally observes that "as a social
primate species we are remarkably susceptible to the wishes of others, especially
alpha males and those in positions of authority." Jd. And "[b ]ecause we evolved to
be such social beings, we are hypersensitive to what others think about us, and we are
strongly motivated to conform to the social norms of our group." Id. at 212.
Consequently, if the head of a business ''team or group or company has a certain
ideology [or philosophy, including engaging in predatory conduct], you have to
follow it to get ahead." Id at 214. "Thus, an environment of moral corporate
philosophy and leaders establishes a situation that can either accentuate the good
disposition of employees or bring out the bad." Id at 215.
167. Marc Goergen et al. argue that "[c]orporations are interested in short-term
profitability. This is because shareholders are generally interested in short-term
profitability."
GOERGEN ET AL., supra note 141, at 42. Unfortunately, the
ChicagolHarvard antitrust philosophy ignores this in focusing on long-term
recoupment of short-term losses as being necessary for dominant-firm conduct to be
predatory.
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ChicagolHarvard fear of "false pOSItIves in dealing with
exclusionary-practice claims,,168 completely ignores the risks of lost
variation, diversity, and complexity l69 and the attendant harms to our
economic system's health and stability.l7O
Unlike the
ChicagolHarvard theoreticians, biologists have long appreciated that
competitively induced diversity enhances an ecosystem's overall
fitness. 171 Increases in overall diversity directly lead to "increased
ecosystem and organism adaptability, resilience and stability." 172
168. Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 357-58.
169. See, e.g., Or1ey C. Ashenfelter, Daniel S. Hosken & Matthew C. Weinberg, The Price
Effects of a Large Merger of Manufacturers: A Case Study of Maytag-Whirlpool 22
(Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17476, 2011), available at
http://ssm.comlabstract=1857066 ("We observe a large reduction in the number of
distinct items (stock-keeping units or SKUs) offered to consumers following the
[Maytag-Whirlpool] acquisition, and this reduction is largest III the clothes washer and
dryer markets that were the focus of the government's investigation. If the number of
distinct SKUs are a meaningful measure of product variety, this finding suggests that
the merger may have resulted in a large, and potentially important, reduction in
variety."); James E. Lovelock, The Earth as a Living Organism, in BIODIVERSITY,
supra note 114, at 486, 488 ("[N]ew ecological models demonstrate that as diversity
increases so does stability and resilience."). But see Michaela Draganska, Michael J.
Mazzeo & Katja Seim, Beyond Plain Vanilla: Modeling Joint Pricing and Product
Assortment and Pricing Decisions, QUANTITATIVE MARKETING & ECON., June 2009, at
105 (discussing papers reaching contrasting conclusions as to whether mergers that
result in more concentrated markets tend to display more or less product variety postmerger).
170. See, e.g., STUART A. KAUFFMAN, REINVENTING THE SACRED: A NEW VIEW OF SCIENCE,
REASON, AND RELIGION 151 (2008) ("[A]s data confirm-economic growth is
positively correlated with economic diversity."); Horton, supra note 12, at 489 ("[I]t
should not surprise us to find a correlation between economic diversity and overall
economic growth. ").
171. For example, in 1859, Charles Darwin "argued that island ecosystems are more
invasible because their level of competition is too weak to exclude introduced
species." E. G. Leigh, Jr. et aI., What Do Human Economies, Large Islands, and
Forest Fragments Reveal About the Factors Limiting Ecosystem Evolution?, 22 J.
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY I, 6 (2009); see also EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF
LIFE 129-30 (1992) ("[In nature, dominant groups tend to divide [through adaptive
radiation into multiple species] that adopt different ways of life. [And] dominant
groups that have diversified to this degree ... are on average better off than those
composed only of a single species; as a purely incidental effect, highly diversified
groups have better balanced their investments and will probably persist longer into the
future.").
172. Horton, supra note 13, at 488; see also James E. Lovelock, The Earth as a Living
Organism, in BIODIVERSITY, supra note 114, at 488; Bryan Norton, Commodity,
Amenity, and Morality: The Limits of Quantification in Valuing Biodiversity, in
BIODIVERSITY, supra note 117, at 200,203 ("The value of biological diversity is more
than the sum of its parts."); Ruth Patrick, Biodiversity: Why Is It Important?, in
BIODIVERSITY II: UNDERSTANDING AND PROTECTING OUR BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES 15,
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Quite simply, "[t]he more species that live in an ecosystem, the
higher its productivity and the greater its ability to withstand drought
and other kinds of environmental stress." 173
The Chicago/Harvard antitrust philosophy also overlooks the
short-term temptations for dominant fIrms to take the easy
competitive way out by knocking out or acquiring competitors rather
than focusing on developing better products and creating more
innovations. 174 This is especially troublesome because constant
innovation and product improvement are critical to our continuing
economic growth,175 and increasing product quality and innovation is
a direct result of increasing competition in an environment of diverse
competitors. 176
Consequently, we should begin to recognize the importance of
competitor diversity and variation, and stop relying upon the facile,
and historically and evolutionarily incorrect statement that it is
important only to protect "competition, not competitors." There is no
good reason to allow economically diverse competitors to be
annihilated by unfair and exclusionary dominant-frrm conduct, or

17 (MaIjorie L. Reake-Kudla et al. eds., 1997) ("[I]t is easy to understand that
terrestrial ecosystems are dependent on a high diversity of macro- and microscopic
organisms if the functioning of the ecosystem is to be efficient.").
173. EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILlENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 294 (1998)
[hereinafter CONSILlENCE]; see also Horton, supra note 12, at 488 ("On the other
hand, ecosystems with a 'relative lack of diversity' and variability are inherently
unstable and subject to invasion by species from outside the ecosystem.") (citing Peter
M. Vitousek, Diversity and Biological Invasions of Oceanic Islands, in BIODIVERSITY,
supra note 114, at 181, 184 (discussing why isolated species are more susceptible to
extinction caused by biological invasions».
174. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 72-81 (1911) (finding
Standard Oil guilty of monopolizing the petroleum industry by using its size to
vertically integrate, acquiring ownership of entities from the oil exploration stage
through service stations offering their refined products to consumers, which allowed
Standard Oil to undercut competitors' costs to the point of bankruptcy or a sellout);
Horton, supra note 12, at 501 ("Unfortunately, history has shown over and over that
monopolies and dominant firms can and do, behave badly and cannot be trusted.").
175. See, e.g., DAVIDSON, supra note 1, at 63-65, 149-53 (discussing importance of small
firms and individuals to economic innovation and how important innovation is to
"increased productivity and economic growth").
176. Id. at 149-66. See generally BURTON H. KLEIN, DYNAMIC ECONOMICS (1977);
MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990); Thomas L.
Friedman, Op-Ed., Start-Ups, Not Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2010, at WK9
(,"Between 1980 and 2005, virtually all net new jobs created in the U.S. were created
by firms that were 5 years old or less."') (quoting Robert Litan of the Kauffman
Foundation, "which specializes in promoting innovation in America").
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177

aggressIve mergers.
Instead, we should protect healthy and stable
competition by guarding competitors against such antitrust violations,
and by pursuing merger policies that promote and protect variation
and diversity rather than concentration. 178
A recent ray of sunshine and hope emerged on August 19, 2010,
when the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission released comprehensive revisions (''N ew Merger
Guidelines") to their 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which had
last been revised in April of 1997.179 One dramatic change is the
signaling of "a commitment toward more aggressive horizontal
merger enforcement driven by a renewed emphasis on the Clayton
Act's incipiency standard.,,180 In addition, "they indicate heightened
concerns about potential unilateral effects, including exclusionary
conduct, and impacts on non-price competition such as quality,
variety, and innovation.,,181 As part of this approach, the New Merger
Guidelines state in Section 6.4 that the "Agencies may consider
whether a merger is likely to diminish innovation competition by
encouraging the merged ftrm to curtail its innovative efforts below
the level that would prevail in the absence of the merger.,,182 "The
New [Merger] Guidelines add that curtailed innovation could take the
form of reduced incentives to continue with existing productdevelopment efforts or the development of new productS.,,183

177.

178.

179.
180.

181.
182.
183.

See Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. ILL.
L. REv. 497, 500 (2009) (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,
428 (2d Cir. 1945)); Geerat J. Vermeij, Comparative Economics: Evolution and the
Modern Economy, 11 1. BIOECONOMICS 105, 128 (2009) ("[P]olicies of [economic]
concentration are both risky and inconsistent with the lessons from the economies of
nature.").
See. e.g., CONSILIENCE, supra note 173, at 294 ("Recent experimental studies on
whole ecosystems support what ecologists have long suspected: The more species that
live in an ecosystem, the higher its productivity and the greater its ability to withstand
drought and other kinds of environmental stress.").
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf.
Thomas 1. Horton, The New United States Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Devolution.
Evolution. or Counterrevolution?, 2 1. EUR. COMPETITION LAW & PRAC. 158, 158
(2011); U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N,supra note 179, at 1,25.
Horton, supra note 180, at 158; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra
note 179, at 2.
U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 179, § 6.4, at 23.
Horton, supra note 180, at 162; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Harm To Competition
Under the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 39 REv. INDus. ORG. 3, 6-8 (2011)
(observing that the New Merger Guidelines have concluded that in many instances
non-dominant firms have greater incentives to innovate, but that acquisition by a
dominant firm could eliminate these incentives); TiM Wu, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE

2012] Unraveling the ChicagolHarvard Antitrust Double Helix

647

While the New Merger Guidelines offer some hope, a new
conservative administration could quickly seek to rescind or modify
them. 184 Furthermore, the New Merger Guidelines "are not law and
the American courts are not therefore bound to follow or defer to
them.,,185 Nevertheless, they represent a potential beginning in the
process of unraveling the Chicago/Harvard antitrust double helix and
replacing its fIrst strand with an evolutionarily-based philosophy
consistent with the antitrust laws' framers' intent. 186
III. UNRAVELING THE CHICAGO/HARVARD APPROACH TO
ANTITRUST JURY TRIALS
A key component of the second strand of the Chicago/Harvard
antitrust double helix has been an all-out attack against jury trials in
Section 2 monopolization and attempted monopolization cases. 187
Professor Donald F. Turner did not mince words in 1987 when he
argued that "[ t]here would be signifIcant gains from eliminating jury
trials in private antitrust actions.,,188
Turner believed that
"substituting court trials for jury trials would reduce the private and
public costs of antitrust litigation... [and] facilitate both the
narrowing of the issues to be put to full trial and the granting of
summary judgment.,,189 Without citing any support, Professor Turner
added that "elimination of juries would increase the probability of
accurate results.,,19o

RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES (2010) (documenting how innovation in the
telecommunications industry has come primarily from nondominant and outsider
firms).
184. Conservative economist Jerry Hausman, for example, quickly criticized the New
Merger Guidelines as devolutionary. See Jerry Hausman, 2010 Merger Guidelines:
Empirical Analysis, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Oct. 2010), http;//www.americanbar.
org! content!darn! aba/publishing!antitrust_source/Oct 10]ullSource.
authcheckdam.pdf.
185. Horton, New Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 183, at 163; see, e.g., New
York v. Group Health, Inc., No. 06-Civ. 13122, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60196, at
*16-19 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2010) (rejecting efforts by antitrust plaintiff to amend its
complaint to include the upper pricing pressure test, which appears in the New Merger
Guidelines).
186. See supra Part II.
187. See DAVIDSON, supra note 1, at 79, 85-87 (discussing how Chicago School antitrust
theories have "eliminated the fact finding role of the jury"); Kovacic, supra note 7, at
51-52.
188. Turner, supra note 20, at 812.

189. Id.
190. Id.
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Professor Turner recognized that there was a slight "problem"
with his anti-democratic proposal: the Seventh Amendment to the
He therefore recommended "a
United States Constitution. 191
congressional statute eliminating jury trial of private antitrust
actions.,,192
Congress, of course, never seriously took up Professor Turner's
anti-democratic suggestion to try to override the Seventh Amendment
in antitrust cases. Nevertheless, academic and judicial disciples of
the ChicagolHarvard antitrust philosophy have pressed forward and
implemented Professor Turner's recommendation that "[s]o long as
private antitrust actions are triable to juries, it is important that the
bases for summary judgment be expanded .... ,,193 Their success has
nearly eliminated the Seventh Amendment's protections in
monopolization cases today.194 As any seasoned antitrust lawyer can
tell you today, procuring a Section 2 plaintiff s jury verdict and
seeing it successfully through the appeals process is akin to getting "a
camel to go through the eye of a needle .... "195

191.

192.
193.

194.

195.

Id. at 813. The Amendment states in part, "In Suits at common law, where the value
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved." U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Supreme Court additionally expanded the
Seventh Amendment's coverage to actions enforcing statutory rights "if the statute
creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary
courts of law." Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189,194 (1974).
Turner, supra note 22, at 814.
Id. Professor Turner cited aspiration ally to Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 106 S. Ct. 2505
(1986); and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986).
See, e.g., ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST
LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 672,
699-700 (2d ed. 2008) (Observing that "[t]ogether, Matsushita and Brooke Group
have proven to be formidable hurdles to the successful prosecution of predatory
pricing cases. Since Matsushita was decided in 1986, no plaintiff, including the
Department of Justice, has succeeded in satisfying the two prong 'below cost +
recoupment' standard." [Furthermore, "no plaintiff, public or private, has prevailed in
a case controlled by Brooke Group. In contrast, the few recent cases in which
plaintiffs have prevailed under Section 2, cases like LePage's and Microsoft [nonjury], the Court relied on Aspen Skiing
dominant firm defendants see in Brooke
Group a deferential standard that provides them with significant discretion to structure
their primary competitive conduct free from any serious threat of antitrust liability. ").
Mark 10:25 (King James); see Kovacic, supra note 7, at 73-80, for an excellent
analysis of how "assumptions about the asserted dangers of overdeterrence from
private enforcement in the United States ought not be accepted as a matter of faith and
ought to be tested vigorously in light of modern experience and empirical study." Id
at 75 (citing Robert H. Lande, Five Myths About Antitrust Damages, 40 U.S.F. L.
REv. 651 (2006)).
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A key lynchpin of the Chicago/Harvard school's practical
negation of plaintiffs' Seventh Amendment rights in antitrust cases
has been a flank attack designed to nullify and eliminate the use of
intent evidence in Section 2 cases. ]96 In a 1987 California Law
Review article complementary to Professor Turner's, Professor
Areeda argued that even "accepted uses of intention can ultimately
mislead courts and juries. ,,]97 Areeda added: "[E]vidence of intention
is often extremely prejudicial because the language of businessmen in
the heat of competitive battle may sound predatory in the legal calm
of the courtroom.,,]98 He then concluded that allowing jurors to rely
on intent evidence "can interfere with efficient operation of business
enterprises and that, by creating enormous uncertainty, burdens a
frrm and the legal system with unnecessary costS.,,]99
Professor Areeda's and Turner's flank attack on the use of intent
evidence in Section 2 cases has succeeded. Following the second
strand of the Chicago/Harvard antitrust double helix, "the focus of
recent cases has been on the propriety of the monopolist's conduct,
not its subjective desire to win the competitive battle.,,20o Over and
over, the courts have used forgiving language to rationalize and
neuter strong evidence of dominant firms' predatory intent toward
competitors. 20 ] For example, in A.A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre
196. See Kovacic, supra note 7, at 53.
197. Phillip Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the
Future, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 959,963 (1987).
198. Id.; see also Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227,232 (1st Cir.
1983) ("'[I]ntent to hann' without more offers too vague a standard in a world where
executives may think no further than 'Let's get more business' .... "). Tellingly, the
First Circuit never explained how its logic that executives may think only in the shorttenn squares with the rationale that business predators carefully and rationally
calculate the long-tenn implications of their aggressive conduct. See id. at 230-36.
199. Areeda, supra note 197, at 965; see also Kovacic, supra note 7, at 53. The Supreme
Court has "relied extensively" on Areeda-Turner in analyzing predatory pricing
allegations. Id. at 45-46 n.139.
200. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 243.
201. See, e.g., Endsley v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 276, 283 (7th Cir. 2000). While
monopoly power is not unlawful without the element of predatory intent, "[b]y intent,
we do not mean intent to obtain a monopoly or to capture an ongoing increase in
market share. This of course IS the aim of every business endeavor." Id.; see also
Int'l Travel Arrangers v. NWA, Inc., 991 F.2d 1389, 1394-96 (8th Cir. 1993); Ocean
State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield ofR.!., 883 F.2d 1101,
1113 (l st Cir. 1989) ("[T]he desire to crush a competitor, standing alone, is
insufficient to make out a violation of the antitrust laws."); Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v.
Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1338 (7th Cir. 1986) ("'[I]ntent to hann rivals'
is not a useful standard in antitrust."); Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel.
Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[I]f conduct is not objectively
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Farms, 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989), Judge Frank Easterbrook and
the Seventh Circuit upheld a district court's overturning of plaintiff
egg producing and processing competitors' Section 2 jury verdict.
Judge Easterbrook stated that even though overwhelming evidence of
predatory intent "impressed the jury,,,202 it had no real probative value
under Matsushita 203 or Professor Areeda's and Turner's
recommendations. 204
It is time to unravel and discard the philosophical assumptions of
the second Chicago/Harvard antitrust helix strand dedicated to
keeping Section 2 antitrust cases away from jurors by glorifying
judges' alleged abilities to better understand and apply so-called
objective economic theory while ignoring evidence of actual intent.
Applying an evolutionary approach, we should rely upon the base
pairs A-T, which will stand for reviving antitrust jury trials. The new
A-T base pairs will protect our Seventh Amendment jury trial rights

anti competitive the fact that it was motivated by hostility to competitors. . 1S
irrelevant. ").
202. A. A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989).
203. Id. at 1401 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
595(1986». Judge Easterbrook explained:
Reference to intent could not help the court determine whether
recoupment is possible, and unless recoupment is possible, and
unless recoupment lies in stone even the most vicious intent is
harmless to the competitive system.
Almost all evidence bearing on 'intent' tends to show both
greed-driven desire to succeed and glee at a rival's
predicament.. . [A] desire to extinguish one's rivals is entirely
consistent with, often is the motive behind competition.
[S]tatements of this sort readily may be misunderstood by lawyers
and jurors, whose expertise lies in fields other than economics.
Intent does not help to separate competition from attempted
monopolization and invites juries to penalize hard competition. It
also complicates litigation. Lawyers rummage through business
records seeking to discover tidbits that will sound impressive (or
aggressive) when read to a jury.
Traipsing through the
warehouses of business in search of misleading evidence both
increases the costs of litigation and reduces the accuracy of
decisions. Stripping intent away brings the real economic
questions to the fore at the same time as it streamlines antitrust
litigation .... [W]e [therefore] now hold that intent is not a basis
of liability (or a ground for inferring the existence of such a basis)
in a predatory pricing case under the Sherman Act.
Id. at 1401-02.
204. !d. at 1404.
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in monopolization cases, and allow juries to assess and evaluate
evidence of predatory intent. 2os
This section discusses why jurors are better equipped than "judges
constrained by technical analyses and captured by the economic
theories before them,,206 to engage successfully in the "difficult
business,,207 of separating dangerous predatory behavior from
aggressive pro-competitive conduct. Section lILA first discusses
why jurors are especially well-equipped to meaningfully assess and
evaluate evidence of predatory intent, and apply community
standards of morality and fairness. 2os Section I1LB then explains how
juries provide a robust evolutionary means for evaluating complex
economic issues and reaching meaningful consensuses in antitrust
cases concerning potential predatory and unfair anti-competitive
Section IILe
conduct by dominant firms and monopolies. 209
discusses how reviving antitrust jury trials will help restore and
revitalize a valuable and necessary community-based investment in
our antitrust laws and their enforcement. 210

A.

Jurors Are Evolutionarily-Equipped to Meaningfully Assess
Predatory Intent and Apply Community Standards of Morality
and Fairness in Section 2 Cases

Our most basic behavioral dispositions are the results of millions
of years of evolution, and "cannot be understood without recourse to
205. See infra Part III. A.
206. Horton, supra note 12, at 522.
207. A. A. Poultry Farms, 848 F.2d at 1400. Ironically, Judge Easterbrook characterizes
the separation of predatory and pro-competitive conduct as a "difficult business." Yet
his simplistic theoretical conclusions tum it into a "simple business" with an
inevitable result: the dominant firm or monopolist wins. See Frank H. Easterbrook,
The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 36-37 (1984) ("[In merger cases, t]he
identity of the plaintiff is all the court needs to know ... [and challenges] by a
business rival against a merger or joint venture should be dismissed."); Frank H.
Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for ExclUSionary
Conduct?, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 345, 357-58 (arguing that predation and
exclusion should be "governed by a wait-and-see attitude" because the economic costs
of false positives are so high); Roszkowski, supra note 49, at 195 (arguing that in
dealer termination cases, "a plaintiff is virtually assured defeat" under Chicago School
economic theories); id. at 165 ("By permitting all defendants using whatever variety
or combinatIOn of vertical restraints to parade the same Chicago School laundry list of
'coulds,' 'mights,' and 'mays' in justification before the trier offact, and requiring the
plaintiff to prove their inapplicability, the plaintiff is guaranteed defeat.").
208. See infra Part IlIA
209. See infra Part III.B.
210. See infra Part III.e.
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evolutionary theory.,,2l1 It is therefore not surprising that we are
witnessing increasing efforts to apply evolutionary theory to human
economic behavior. 212 In the words of legal theorist Bart Du Laing:
"[T]he time has come for evolutionary minded legal scholars to
replenish from the original source, being biological evolutionary
theory, as currently applied in a variety of ways to our own
species. ,,213
Chicago/Harvard economic models based on solitary individual
economic maximizers are inconsistent with our evolutionary history,
which "has ensured that we are able to get more from social living
than from the pursuit of a solitary, selfish life."214 "'[G]reed is
good' ... is a childish and unethical rhetoric, however popular it has
been on Wall Street and in the Department of Economics."215 Our
dynamic economic system is dependent upon our unique evolutionary
history of successful cooperation-not greed?16 Future economic

211. WOJCIECH ZALUSKI, EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, at ix (2009).
212. See, e.g., BEINHOCKER, supra note 110, at 187 ("[O]rganizations, markets, and
economics are not just like evolutionary systems; they truly, literally are evolutionary
systems ...."); Horton, supra note 12, at 469-71 (recommending that we look to
evolutionary biology for guidance in applying the antitrust laws).
213. Bart Du Laing, Gene-Culture Co-Evolutionary Theory and the Evolution of Legal
Behavior and Institutions, in LAW, ECONOMICS AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORY, supra
note 23, at 248, 264.
214. MARTIN A. NOWAK & ROGER HIGHFIELD, SUPER COOPERATORS: ALTRUISM,
EVOLUTION, AND WHY WE NEED EACH OTHER TO SUCCEED 272 (2011); see also
DAVIDSON, supra note 1, at 128 ("Chicago theory lacks an explanation of the
administrative dynamics of organizations.").
215. DEIDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, BOURGEOIS DIGNITY: WHY ECONOMICS CAN'T EXPLAIN THE
MODERN WORLD 446 (2010).
216. See, e.g., SEABRIGHT, supra note 156, at 4-5.
Homo sapiens sapiens is the only animal that engages in
elaborate task-sharing-the division of labour as it is sometimes
known-between genetically unrelated members of the same
species.
. . Nowhere else in nature do unrelated members of the same
species-genetic rivals incited by instinct and history to fight one
another-cooperate on projects of such complexity and requiring
such a high degree of mutual trust as human beings do.
Jd.
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theories must therefore be based as much on ethics and moralitl 17 as
on domination, greed, and selfishness. 218
Our long history of economic cooperation has enabled and
required us to construct social rules and habits that appropriately
constrain our "violent and unreliable instincts.,,219 Maximally robust
moral reasoning has evolved in humans to enable us to appropriately
balance our cooperation and selfish instincts. 220 Our social rules and
habits have further enabled us to develop "a rich network of
facilitating relationships" based upon "cooperation, mutual support,
and enrichment.,,221 As stated by Harvard mathematics and biology
Professor Martin A. Nowak: "[I]f conscience and empathy were
impediments to the advancement of self-interest, then we would have
evolved to be amoral sociopaths. But we have not.,,222
Evidence from a host of fields shows that "fairness evolved as a
stable strategy for maintaining social harmony" in our economic
relationships.223 Neurobiological studies have found that "the sense

217.

218.

219.
220.

221.
222.

223.

See Du Laing, supra note 213, at 255 ("[C]ulture appears more as a part of the
solution than as a part of the problem. . .. [T]his emphasis on a plausible
evolutionary theory of social norms and institutions is of particular relevance for an
evolutionary analysis in law aiming at incorporating regulating behavior in its
analyses.").
See, e.g., GOODWIN, supra note 122, at xii-xiii.
Darwinism sees the living process in terms that emphasize
competition, inheritance, selfishness, and survival as the driving
forces of evolution. . . . But Darwinism shortchanges our
biological natures. We are every bit as cooperative as we are
competitive; as altruistic as we are selfish ..
And we are
biologically grounded in relationships ....
Jd.; see also RUSE, supra note 121, at 2 ("[Economic Darwinism and 'survival of the
fittest' have] reflect[ed] and justifie[d] the grossest sins in our society-domination,
greed, selfishness, sexism, and more002E").
SEABRIGHT, supra note 156, at 6.
CASEBEER, supra note 112, at 6, 59-61, 71; see also RUSE, supra note 121, at 279
("Humans are not all bad. We cooperate and work together. Humans are not all
good. We are selfish and serve our own ends rather than the needs of others. This is
our nature .... ").
GOODWIN, supra note 122, at 188.
NOWAK & HIGHFIELD, supra note 214, at 89-90. "Homo economicus," on the other
hand, "is a sociopath." Lynn Ann Stout, Taking Conscience Seriously, in MORAL
MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 157, 158-59 (Paul J. Zak
ed., 2008). Stout adds, "The hallmark of sociopathy is extreme selfishness as shown
by a willingness to lie, cheat, take advantage, [and] exploit." Id. at 159 (quoting
BENJAMIN WOLMAN, THE SOCIOPATHIC PERSONALITY 42 (1987».
SHERMER, supra note 160, at II. Similarly, "[a]mong chimpanzees, a rudimentary
sense of right and wrong, related to what serves their group's common good, plays a
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of fairness fundamental to distributive justice" is rooted in humans'
I process mg.
. 224 In short, human morality helps us to
·
emo t lOna
mediate the inherent tensions between our cooperative and
competitive, and altruistic and selfish instincts. 225 Indeed, "diverse
faiths are united by the reciprocity of the Golden Rule.,,226
As a function of our robust moral capacities, we are wellequipped, from an evolutionary and social perspective, to fairly
evaluate the predatory intent of dominant firms and monopolists. 227
Humans have developed keen abilities to quickly figure out who can
be trusted in ongoing economic interactions. 228 "Brain imaging
seems to support the view that part of our cortex is specialized to deal
with the ceaseless computations required to keep count of what we
give and what we receive, and to respond emotionally to perceived
imbalance.,,229 In other words, humans are evolutionarily hard-wired
to quickly judge others' intentions. 230
Humans have to be good at reading others' intentions 231 because
our evolutionary development of languages has dramatically
increased the opportunities for manipulation and deception when we
seek to cooperate with others. 232 We understand "that a mix of

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

229.

230.
231.

232.

crucial role in maintaining a chimpanzee group's integrity." Leigh, supra note 113, at
381.
ROUGHGARDEN, supra note 119, at 160.
See GOODWIN, supra note 122, at xiii; RUSE, supra note 121, at 252-54.
See NOWAK & HIGHFIELD, supra note 214, at 273.
See Horton, supra note 12, at 505,510.
See KARL SIGMUND, THE CALCULUS OF SELFISHNESS 19 (2010) ("[P]layers [in a
Prisoner's Dilemma game] who are allowed to briefly talk with each other.. can
predict very accurately, after a short conversation, whether their co-players will
cooperate or not. Even without knowing which type of experiment is in store for
them, they quickly pick up the relevant clues for summing up their partner.");
EDWARD O. WILSON, THE FUTURE OF LIFE 151 (2002) ("People by and large are
natural geniuses at spotting deception in others."); Horton, supra note 13, at 518
("The human brain has evolved masterful abilities to calculate fairness. Parallel with
this evolution, we have developed keen abilities to detect cheating." (footnote
omitted)).
See SIGMUND, supra note 228, at 9. For an interesting discussion of human brains as
"extremely complex information-processing machines," see SEIFE, supra note 9, at
211-15.
See NOWAK WITH HIGHFIELD, supra note 214, at 55.
See id. ("We require, in the parlance of the psychologists, a 'theory of mind,' that
remarkable capacity that enables us to understand the desires, motivations, and
intentions of others. This mind-reading ability allows us to infer another's
perspective-whether emotional or intellectual. ").
See id. at 187 ("[L]anguage, brainpower, and society became entwined in a three-way
dance. What resulted as each component moved in step with one another was
coevolution, a spiral toward more and more social complexity as language allowed for
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cooperators (law-abiding citizens) and defectors (criminals) will
always persist in human societies.,,233 Consequently, we have
developed acute sensitivities toward others' intentions. 234 We are
therefore evolutionarily well-equipped to meaningfully evaluate and
react to others' maxims and intentions. 235
The reason that juries have been "impressed,,236 by evidence of
predatory intent is that such evidence strikes deep evolutionary
chords. 237 On the other hand, the so-called rational Chicago/Harvard
economic models that eschew fairness and intent lack meaningful
biological, evolutionary, or historical foundations. 238 Consequently,
we should welcome evidence and information about the motivations
and intentions that lie behind the actions of dominant ftrms and
monopolists.239 We should allow antitrust juries to assess such
evidence fully in judging predatory behavior. 240
Jurors are also well-prepared to meaningfully apply and enforce
community standards of morality and fairness in antitrust cases. 241

even more manipulation and deception, and even more collaboration and cooperation
too."); RIDLEY, supra note 130, at 116 ("The notion that our brains grew big to help us
make tools or start fires on the savannah has long since lost favour. Instead, most
evolutionists believe in the Machiavellian theory-that bigger brains were needed in
an arms race between manipulation and resistance to manipulation.").
233. NOWAK & HIGHFIELD, supra note 214, at 37.
234. See CHARLES DARWIN, THE EXPRESSION OF THE EMOTIONS IN MAN AND ANIMALS 35759 (Univ. Chi. Press 1965) (1872) ("As most of the movements of expression must
have been gradually acquired, afterwards becoming instinctive, there seems to be
some degree of priori probability that their recognition would likewise have become
instinctive. . .. [A]ll the chief expressions exhibited by man are the same throughout
the world."); WILSON, supra note 173, at 171-72 ("[O]ne capacity, the detection of
cheating, is developed to exceptional levels of sharpness and rapid calculation.");
WILSON, supra note 228, at 151 ("Psychologists.. have discovered a hereditary
tendency to detect cheaters and to respond to them with intense moral outrage.").
235. In this sense, unlike the ChicagolHarvard theoreticians, we rely less on consequences
and more on states of mind and intentions in making our moral evaluations. See
CASEBEER, supra note 112, at 131 ("Our maxims and intentions are what counts, not
the outcomes of our actions.").
236. See A. A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1398-99 (7th
Cir. 1989).
237. See ZALUSKI, supra note 211, at xi.
238. See DAVIDSON, supra note 1, at 128-31.
239. See PRASANTA K. PATTANAIK, ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING AND SOCIAL
WELF ARE 14 (2009) ("While the game form approach provides a flexible framework
for the analysis of rights, I now believe that it needs to be supplemented by
information that lies behind people's actions.").

a

240. See id.
241. See Du LAING, supra note 213, at 248, 254-55; ZALUSKI, supra note 211, at 123.
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Humans' willingness to enforce community standards is a product of
natural selection and is critical in supporting economic
cooperation. 242 Jurors are willing to apply community morality
standards and punish defectors (or antitrust violators) in the hopes of
reforming them and to retaliate on behalf of and protect third parties
(such as injured competitors).243
The threat of societal retaliation is crucial in protecting economic
cooperation. 244 The threat of revenge sharply reduces the incidence
of cheating in economic game simulations. 245 Antitrust juries provide
an ideal "threat point" against predatory conduce46 because jurors are
willing to apply community standards to protect injured parties.
Furthermore, juries are not intimidated because a dominant fIrm or
monopolist cannot realistically retaliate against individual jurors. 247
Dominant fIrms and monopolists are far more likely to act fairly
and procompetitively if they face a realistic possibility of a jury
fmding out about their predatory conduct and holding them
accountable for it. 248 Such f]fms understand that their goodwill and
positive business reputations come at a great economic cost and can
242.

See, e.g., ZALUSKI, supra note 215, at 114 ("It seems that the instinct for retaliation is
a product of natural selection: generally speaking it is evolutionarily advantageous for
a victim of immoral treatment to punish a person who violated the norms of the firstorder morality with regard to her, as it shows the wrongdoer and other potential
violators of these norms that the person who displays this emotion cannot be easily
exploited.
One should also add that altruistic punishment is regarded as a
component of strong reciprocity. ").
243. See SIGMUND, supra note 228, at 15.
244. See, e.g., NOWAK & HIGHFIELD, supra note 214, at 29 ("It seem[s] that the prospect of
vengeful retaliation paves the way for amicable cooperation.").
245. See, e.g., SEABRIGHT, supra note 156, at 68.
246. See, e.g., ROUGHGARDEN, supra note 119, at 148.
247. On the other hand, the temptations to engage in predatory behavior seem
overwhelming in a legal system that offers no countervailing credible threat to such
behavior (like the current Chicago/Harvard system). See id. at 148-49 ("For
computation purposes [in determining what the optimal bargain is], Nash showed that
the optimal compromise is uniquely found by maximizing the product of the
individual's net payoffs relative to their threat point.").
248. See NOWAK & HIGHFIELD, supra note 214, at 54 ("By the same token, our behavior is
endlessly molded by the possibility that somebody else might be watching us or fmd
out what we have done. We are often troubled by the thought of what others may
think of our deeds. .. Our behavior is [therefore] affected by the possibility that
somebody else might be watching us."); id. at 217 ("When people behave in a
charitable way, it reveals much about the fact that their behavior has been honed down
the generations by ancestors wanting to make a good impression whenever they find
themselves in circumstances where they suspect they are being watched. This need to
impress was felt as keenly in a close-knit hunter-gatherer clan as in today's
surveillance society. ").
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be sullied, compromised, or destroyed through public trials and
jurors' exposure to evil and anticompetitive intent. 249 As Harvard
evolutionary biologist and mathematical theoretician Martin Nowak
observes: "Whenever individual behavior is relevant to the public
good, it should itself be made public to help avert tragedy. ,,250
Indeed, "a simple mathematical model reveals how concerns for
reputation can lead to the establishment of fairness norms. ,,251
The Chicago/Harvard theorists concede that, in monopolization
cases:
[t]he defendant's stated purpose can often point the
tribunal's analysis in the correct direction: toward a
determination of whether that purpose is legitimate in
principle and, if so, whether the challenged conduct is
reasonably necessary to serve that purpose. Intention may
also help to classify otherwise ambiguous behavior. 252
It is time to hold them to this concession. Since jurors are
evolutionarily well-equipped to meaningfully assess predatory intent
and apply community standards of morality and fairness in Section 2
cases,253 we should let them return to doing the jobs that our nation's
founders intended they do. The time has come to revive antitrust jury
trials in monopolization cases.

B.

Juries Provide a Robust Evolutionary and Democratic Means for
Evaluating Complex Economic Issues and Reaching Meaningful
Consensuses in Section 2 Cases

Why do we have nine justices on our Supreme Court? Why do we
have 100 senators and 435 congressmen? Why does our President
have a cabinet? Why did our nation's founders include a right to jury
trials in our Constitution? The simple answer is that '''[t]he more
complex the problem and the more complex the environment, the

249.

250.

251.
252.
253.

See id. at 55 ("Indirect reciprocity relies on what others think of us. . .. [I]f you have
been a cad and a rotter, I am less likely to trust you to deliver."); SIGMUND, supra note
228, at 13 ("Under natural circumstances, an emotional response is likely to attract
some attention. Anger is loud.").
NOWAK & HIGHFIELD, supra note 214, at 218. Nowak adds that "[w]e need new ways
to advertise how people behave." Id. Antitrust jury trials offer us one of the best
ways to gain insights into dominant finns' and monopolies' real goals and intentions.
SIGMUND, supra note 228, at 13.
Areeda, supra note 197, at 963.
See supra notes 227-230 and accompanying text.
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more diverse points of view you need. ",254 Moreover, the "vigorous
discussion characteristic of diverse decision making bodies also
promotes fact-fmding.,,255
A jellybean contest can help us '"understand the extraordinary
potential of combined brainpower.,,256 When individuals try to guess
the number of jelly beans in a jar, their initial estimates inevitably are
off the mark. 257 Amazingly, however, when one averages their
guesses, "the average of everyone's guess[es] in a jelly bean contest
will come significantly closer than anyone person's guess.,,258
Moreover, "the greater the number of people participating, the closer
the collaborative guess becomes.,,259
Could our founding fathers therefore have gotten it right in our
Seventh Amendment? After all, juries, like any biological system,
"are information-processing machines and this must be an essential
part of any theory we may construct.,,260 More than a century ago,
our Supreme Court seemed to agree. For example, in Sioux City &
Pacific Railroad v. Stout,261 the Court observed:
Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising
men of education and men of little education, men of
learning and men whose learning consists only in what they
have themselves seen and heard, the merchant, the
mechanic, the farmer, the laborer; these sit together, consult,
apply their separate experience of the affairs of life to the
facts proven, and draw a unanimous conclusion. . .. It is
assumed that twelve men know more of the common affairs
of life than does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer
254. JEFFREY KLUGER, SIMPLEXITY: WHY SIMPLE THINGS BECOME COMPLEX (AND How
COMPLEX THINGS CAN BE MADE SIMPLE) 39 (2008) (quoting Brooke Harrington,
sociologist and professor of public policy); see also CASEBEER, supra note 112, at 144
("The epistemology of discovering proper functions is essentially scientific-it
requires experimentation and a toleration of a certain diversity of approaches, as well
as a communitarian commitment to constant criticism and improvement. This inquirybased epistemology fits in well with our softly fixed natures ....").
255. Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J. L. & POL'y 19, 45
(2007); see also Phoebe Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 217 (1989) (noting that the "counterbalancing of various
biases" is a benefit of the jury system (quoting Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234
(1978».
256. KLUGER, supra note 254, at 37.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 37.
259. Id. at 38.
260. See Brenner, supra note 131, at 40, 44.
261. Sioux City & P. RR., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873).
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conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a
single judge. 262
Eschewing our Supreme Court's earlier democratic reasoning,
Professor Turner argued that "elimination of [antitrust] juries would
increase the probability of accurate results.,,263
Juries, the
ChicagoiHarvard theorists contend, are simply unable "to arrive at a
rational decision because the nature and complexity of the factual and
legal issues raised in most antitrust cases are beyond their
competence. ,,264
The Chicago/Harvard approach represents anti-democratic
paternalism at its worst. Why are we so certain that juries cannot
fairly assess and evaluate predatory conduct? As noted by Professor
Adam J. Hirsch, "[T]he cognitive deficiencies of judges
themselves-being every bit as human as the persons whose suits
they hear-suggest that they, too, are apt to make imperfect

262. Id at 664. Approximately twenty years later, the Indiana Court of Appeals concurred,
explaining:
The jurors, in their callings and experiences, have usually come in
contact with, and observed, the conduct of men under varied
It is this diversity which gives value to their
conditions.
unanimous judgment. Collectively, they are more capable of
determining how an ordinarily prudent man would act under given
conditions than judges of courts, whose experiences are usually
confined to one calling, and who are proverbially prone to
generalize and follow precedents.
Louisville, Evansville & St. Louis Consol. Ry. v. Berry, 36 N.E. 646, 650 (Ind. App.
1894). For an excellent discussion of these cases, see Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a
Jury Decision and Questions of Fact Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J.
1125, 1166-67 (2003).
263. Turner, supra note 20, at 812. See also Neil Komesar, Stranger in a Strange Land:
An Outsider·s View of Antitrust and the Courts, 41 LoY. U CHI. L.J. 443,444 (2010)
("There is little doubt that juries have limited technical expertise and sophistication.").
264. Turner, supra note 20, at 812. Professor Turner's sentiments have also been followed
by our current Supreme Court in questioning jurors' abilities to decide factual claims
in patent cases. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 US. 370, 388-90
(1996) (considering "relative interpretive skills of judges and juries" and fmding
judges better suited to interpret patent claims); Kirgis, supra note 262, at 1129; David
B. Pieper, The Appropriate Judicial Actor for Patent Interpretation: A Commentary
on the Supreme Court's Decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 51 ARK.
L. REv. 159 (1998); Theresa M. Seal, Casenote, The Jury Is Out: Supreme Court
Confirms Construction of Patent Claim Falls Within Exclusive Province of the Court,
22 S.ILL. U L.J. 785 (1998).
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choices.,,265 Could it be that the real fear of the Chicago/Harvard
theorists is that juries will decide monopolization cases on the
evidence before them rather than biased and misguided
ChicagolHarvard economic theories?266
We do not live in the simple bright-line world idealized by the
ChicagolHarvard theoreticians. "Modern physicists realize that even
the most solid laws-even the second law [of thermodynamics]have a statistical element to them.,,267 Since "[ e]ven simply
determined systems can behave chaotically," the precise details of
any complex systems are not, as the ChicagolHarvard theoreticians
would have us believe, predictable. 268 But the collaborative hunches
of jurors, based on seeing real witnesses and documents, pushes
toward "the complexities of moderation" rather than "the simplicity
of extremism. ,,269 Thus, juries are well-prepared to evaluate and
analyze "surprises due to the emergence of unexpected behavior,"
such as dangerous and unfair predatory conduct by dominant fIrms
265. Adam 1. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories of Common Law Efficiency: Reasons for
(Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 425, 425 (2005). More fully, Professor
Hirsch observed:
From a behavioral perspective, recognition of the potential for
irrationality by citizens can serve to justify paternalistic rules that
operate to limit choice, and thereby to protect citizens from the
regret that would accompany poor decisions. Yet the cognitive
deficiencies of judges themselves-being every bit as human as
the persons whose suits they hear-suggest that they, too, are apt
to make imperfect choices. As concerns their lawmaking function,
judges' efforts to craft ideal common law rules are doomed to
failure-a failure that (by analogy) paternalistic mechanisms can
forestall only in limited respects.
Accordingly, scholars who posit that judges generally aspire to
establish efficient rules cannot thereby conclude that the common
law tends ineluctably in that direction. Those scholars must take
into account the pressures of time and shortcomings of ability that
degrade judicial decisionmaking. Anything concocted by the
human mind-including law-betrays the infirmities of that mind.
Id. at 425-26 (footnotes omitted).
266. As noted by Flynn and Ponsoldt, the "law and economics movement tends in the
direction of rigid formalism." Flynn & Ponsoldt, supra note 107, at 1139 n.58. They
list possible explanations to include "a desire to impose disguised normative values
for unstated political reasons, protection of the status quo, or fear that undue judicial
discretion would lead to multi valued rules of decision." Id. at 1139 (footnotes
omitted).
267. SEIFE, supra note 9, at 53.
268. RIDLEY,SUpra note 130, at 311-12.
269. KLUGER, supra note 254, at 93; see also GOODWIN, supra note 122, at 78 ("[T]he
study of complex systems goes beyond reductionism, which focuses on the analysis of
the components out of which a system is made.").
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and monopolies. 270 And they are just as well, if not better, equipped
than judges straitjacketed by biased economic theories to sort out and
meaningfully assess the endless mathematical possibilities in our
complex economic environment. 271
Perhaps most importantly, jurors are evolutionarily '''wired for
justice.",272 Neural regions in our brain activated by unfairness "are
the same ones activated by feelings of disgust. That's not just a
dispassionate reaction to an inequitable bargain, that's a primal
recoiling.,,273 Our "sense of fairness is not a thing calculable in a
physics equation,,,274 but it is rooted in our evolutionary core.275
In In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation/76 the
Third Circuit vacated a district judge's order holding that a plaintiff
had a right to trial by jury in an action for treble damages under the
antitrust and antidumping laws.277 Characterizing the case as "too
complex for a jury," the Third Circuit ruled that "due process
precludes trial by jury when a jury is unable to perform this task with
a reasonable understanding of the evidence and the legal rules.,,278
Dissenting, Circuit Judge Gibbons presciently noted:
270. See GOODWIN, supra note 125, at 78.
271. See NOWAK & HIGHFIELD, supra note 214, at 49 ("Despite the thousands of papers
written on the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, the mathematical possibilities in this
model of direct reciprocity are open-ended, like chess, and not closed, like the
strategies for playing tic-tac-toe. Our analysis of how to solve the Dilemma will
never be completed. This Dilemma has no end. ").
272. KLUGER, supra note 254, at 43 (quoting Samuel Bowles, professor of economics).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See, e.g., ROUGHGARDEN, supra note 119, at 160 ("Indeed, neurobiological study has
found that the sense of fairness fundamental to distributive justice 'as suggested by
moral sentimentalists, is rooted in emotional processing.'" (citing Ming Hsu, Cedric
Anen & Steven R. Quartz, The Right and the Good: Distributive Justice and Neural
Encoding of Equity and Efficiency, 320 SCIENCE 1092, 1092 (2008))).
276. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
277. See id. at 1086, 1090.
278. Id. at 1084.
Courts have disagreed as to whether a party's jury demand may
be stricken if the complexity of the case would make it impossible
for a jury to render a fair decision.
The Ninth Circuit
concluded. .. that there is no complexity exception to the
Seventh Amendment right to jury trial.
The Second, Fifth,
and Tenth Circuits have rejected arguments that particular cases
were so complex as to justify denying a jury trial without reaching
the question whether there is a complexity exception.
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 975-76 (footnotes
omitted).
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[A]ttempts to objectify the factors that bear upon
complexity. .. will permit the exercise of trial court
discretion. I fear that the exercise of that discretion will
sometimes be influenced by unarticulated sympathies for or
hostilities toward the underlying policies sought to be
advanced in the lawsuit. 279
Judge Gibbons continued:
Part of my difficulty with the majority's position probably
results from a perception of the nature of the judicial
process and the role of juries in that process. It is often said
that the judicial process involves the search for objective
truth. We have no real assurance, however, of objective
truth whether the trial is to the court or to a jury. The
judicial process can do no more than legitimize the
imposition of sanctions by requiring that some minimum
standards of fair play, which we call due process, are
adhered to. In this legitimizing process, the seventh
amendment is not a useless appendage to the Bill of Rights,
but an important resource in maintaining the authority of the
rule of law ....
In light, therefore, of the important functions served by
the seventh amendment's protection of the right to a trial by
jury, I would hold that there is no case in which properly
separated claims for relief cognizable at common law would
be so complex that trial by jury would amount to a violation
of due process. 280

279. Id. at 1093 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
Jd. After the district judge's ruling permitting a jury trial was vacated and remanded
by the Third Circuit, the district court eventually granted summary judgment for the
defendant Japanese television manufacturers. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1114 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The Third Circuit then affirmed
in part, and reversed in part, the district court's summary judgment ruling. In re
Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 251 (3d Cir. 1983). The
Supreme Court then reversed and remanded the Third Circuit's ruling in a famous 5-4
antitrust decision. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986). Commissioner Kovacic notes that in the Supreme Court's Matsushita
decision, "Areeda and Turner are the most frequently cited commentators." Kovacic,
supra note 7, at 46 n.139.

280.
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We should follow Judge Gibbons' prescient reasoning and
281
embrace and trust jurors' communal senses of fairness and justice
by reviving antitrust jury trials.

C.

Reviving Antitrust Jury Trials Will Help Restore and Revitalize a
Valuable and Necessary Community-Based Investment in Our
Antitrust Laws and Their Enforcement

Citizen participation in public decision-making is the hallmark of
American democracy. 282 Our American citizens bring to the jury
pool their diverse heritages, backgrounds, and experiences "honoring
a balance of virtues.,,283 They also bring a deep "sense of moral
responsibility.,,284 Thrown together as jurors, they produce "a
combinatorial explosion" that represents democracy in action. 285
281. As noted by economist Oliver Williamson:
The Matsushita case dragged on for over a dozen years.
Although a complex case, the core theory espoused by the
plaintiff apparently was that Japanese television manufacturers
engaged in collusion and dumping ....

282.

283.
284.

285.

The Supreme Court, however, did not evaluate the plausibility
of the case by assessing the plaintiffs theory. Rather, the Court
examined the plausibility of the defendant's case [and embraced
Judge Easterbrook's predation theories].
Williamson, supra note 38, at 211, 233-34. With all due respect to the Supreme
Court, a jury of twelve citizens could have more fairly and objectively reviewed the
factual evidence and applied the relevant legal theories, and it would not have taken
anything close to twelve plus years to get a final resolution. Moreover, since
Matsushita, "[t]he study of strategic behavior has been elaborated" to show the
economic plausibility and substantial benefits of defendants' conduct. Id. at 234.
See THOMAS CHRISTIANO, PmLOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 3
(Thomas Christiano ed., 2003); cf New York v. County of Schoharie, 82 F. Supp.
2d 19,23 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Unquestionably, the right to vote in an election is [a]
hallmark of our democracy.").
See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 215, at 438.
See Phillip Clayton, Biology and Purpose: Altruism, Morality, and Human Nature in
Evolutionary Perspective, in EVOLUTION AND ETmcs: HUMAN MORALITY IN
BIOLOGICAL & RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE 318, 331 (Phillip Clayton & Jeffrey Schloss
eds., 2004) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 330. Chicago-Harvard theoreticians would, of course, disagree with this
assessment. At least one evolutionary scientist believes that the "combinatorial
explosion" may not necessarily be a good thing. Professor Richard Dawkins believes
that "[t]rial by jury may be one ofthe most conspicuously bad good ideas anyone ever
had." RICHARD DAWKINS, A DEVIL'S CHAPLAIN: REFLECTIONS ON HOPE, LIES,
SCIENCE, AND LOVE 38 (2003). Dawkins argues that in practice, "twelve assessments
of the evidence" does not really happen because 'juries are massively swayed by one
or two vocal individuals." Id. at 40. Dawkms adds, "There is also strong pressure to
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. I~ IS a mistake to view economic competition as divorced and
dIstmct from our societal culture and fundamental values. 286 Adam
Smith himself long ago recognized that "justice comprehends all the
social virtues."287 Our "human sense of justice explicitly addresses
communitywide issues," and imposes constraints on social and
economic behavior that we "agree[] on and enforce[] collectively.,,288
In enforcing our social and economic virtues and norms, we juggle a
complicated set of shared norms and values. 289 Adam Smith further
recognized that it is futile, as the ChicagolHarvard theoreticians have
attempted, "to direct by precise rules what it belongs to feeling and
sentiment only to judge of. ,,290

confonn to a unanimous verdict, which further undermines the principle of
independent data." Id. It is Important to recognize that Dawkins's opinion rests upon
"the three juries that it has been [his] misfortune to serve on." Id. Based on having
closely watched dozens of mock juries in real and educational cases, this author's
experience does not match Professor Dawkins's.
286. See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUY AM A, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY 6-7 (1995) ("Although economic activity IS inextricably linked with
social and political life, there is a mistaken tendency, encouraged by contemporary
economic discourse, to regard the economy as a facet of life with its own laws,
separate from the rest of society.. " [E]conomic activity represents a crucial part of
social life and is knit together by a wide variety of nonns, rules, moral obligations,
and other habits that together shape the society.").
287. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, reprinted in THE GLASGOW
EDITION OF THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF ADAM SMITH (D. D. Raphael & A.
L. Macfie, eds.) (photo. reprint 1982) (Oxford University Press 1976) (1759).
288. Frans B. M. de Waal, The Chimpanzee's Sense of Social Regularity and Its Relation
to the Human Sense of Justice, in THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF LAW 241,254 (Roger D. Masters & Margaret Gruter eds., 1992).
289. See STEPHEN S. HALL, WISDOM: FROM PHILOSOPHY TO NEUROSCIENCE 207 (2010)
("[A]lthough Homo economicus insists by definition on a narrow and material
definition of 'preference,' Homo sapiens ultimately juggles a much more complicated
set of values.").
290. SMITH, supra note 287, at 339. Smith observed:
It may be said in general of the works of the casuists that they
attempted, to no purpose, to direct by precise rules what it belongs
to feeling and sentiment only to judge of. How is it possible to
ascertain by rules the exact point at which, in every case, a
delicate sense of justice begins to run into a frivolous and weak
What is the highest pitch of
scrupulosity of conscience?
freedom and ease of behaviour which can be regarded as graceful
and becoming, and when it is that it first begins to run into a
negligent and thoughtless licentiousness? With regard to all such
matters, what would hold good in anyone case would scarce do
so exactly in any other, and what constitutes the propriety and
happiness of behavior varies in every case with the smallest
variety of situation. Books of casuistry, therefore, are generally as
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History has proven over and over that businesses sometimes lie,
disseminate disinformation, and engage in predatory conduct
designed to crush competitors. 291 To best protect ourselves against
such manipulation, we must acknowledge and pinpoint "the
vulnerabilities of our faculties of categorization, language, and
imagery," rather than deny or fear their complexity.292 Fortunately,
our "strongly ingrained rules about fairness and reciprocity,,293 and
our evolutionarily-programmed "resistan[ ce] to attack by free riders
and cheaters,,294 are ideal for communally sorting out and evaluating
allegations of predatory conduct by dominant flrms and monopolies.
Rather than fearing jurors' cultural norms and values, we should
welcome their contributions in helping to create and enforce higher
norms of business ethics and conduct. 295 Instead of obsessing about
false positives, we should focus on the societal and economic dangers
of predatory conduct. 296

291.
292.

useless as they are commonly tiresome. .. None of them tend to
soften us to what is gentle and humane. Many of them, on the
contrary, tend rather to teach us to chicane with our own
consciences, and by their vain subtilties serve to authorise
innumerable evasive refinements with regard to the most essential
articles of our duty.
Id. at 339-40. A more recent critic might label the Chicago/Harvard theories as
"greedy reductionism," which can "lead us to deny the existence of real levels, real
complexities, real phenomena." GEORGE LEVINE, DARWIN LOVES You: NATURAL
SELECTION AND THE RE-ENCHANTMENT OF THE WORLD 104 (2006) (quoting DANIEL C.
DENNETT, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANING OF LIFE 82
(1995»; see also Robert Pitofsky, Setting the Stage, in How THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 39, at 5 (noting that concerns today about antitrust
"include current preferences for economic models over facts").
See Horton, supra note 12, at 500-02.
STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 217

(2002).
293. BEINHOCKER, supra note 110, at 121.
294. Id. at 269.
295. See, e.g., FUKUYAMA, supra note 286, at 26 ("Trust is the expectation that arises

296.

within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly
shared norms, on the part of other members of that community. . .. [W]hile contract
and self-interest are important sources of association, the most effective organizations
are based on communities of shared ethical values. These communities do not require
extensive contract and legal regulation of their relations because prior moral
consensus gives members of the group a basis for mutual trust." (citation omitted».
See, e.g., BEINHOCKER, supra note 110, at 270. Beinhocker observes: "The local
tuning of reciprocity norms can create very complex dynamics at the level of
populations. High-cooperation societies can see collapses in cooperation if cheating
reaches a critical mass; low cooperation societies can get stuck 10 uncooperative,
economically impoverished dead ends... " Id. Indeed, "[a] frightening 'lack of
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It is easy for dominant fIrms and monopolies to claim that hard
evidence of predatory intent is merely the meaningless musings of
enthusiastic middle-level managers. After all, humans and businesses
both have enormous capacities for self-deception. Indeed, given
humans' hard-wired skills in mind-reading and deciphering
intentions, "it is to your advantage to sincerely believe in your own
innocence. Biologically as well as socially, it's often advantageous
to deceive yourself into believing that you are fully innocent, since
others are then more likely to believe you as well. ,,297
Furthermore, even though corporations enjoy many of the rights of
individuals through the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
to our constitution, "corporations are neither susceptible to the
standards of accountability nor the deterring effects of punishment to
which people are subject.,,298 For example, a corporation cannot be
put in jail. This has "greatly increase [d] the power of corporations
and [broken] the ties of accountability that attach it to a society as a
whole.,,299
We need to demand more public accountability from our
businesses, especially dominant fIrms and monopolies. "The nature
of the human commitment to morality is that all people in a
community-dominant as well as subordinate-must be held
accountable to the same standards of ethical behavior.,,30o

297.

298.

299.

300.

moral purpose' has been a fundamental problem in our recent economic debacles."
Horton, supra note 12, at 513. Interestingly, in the field of genetics, Matt Ridley has
observed: "Arguably, more damage has been done by false negatives (true genes that
have been prematurely ruled out on inadequate data) than by false positives
(suspicions of a link that later proved unfounded)." Ridley, supra note 130, at 73.
Clayton, supra note 284, at 328; see also PINKER, supra note 292, at 111 (,,[T]he best
liar is one who believes his own lie."); id at 325 ("Since the most effective bluffer is
the one who believes his own bluff, a limited degree of self-deception in hostile
escalations can evolve. It has to be limited, because . . . when the limits are
miscalibrated and both sides go to the brink, the result can be a human disaster.").
GOERGEN ET AL., supra note 141, at 103. For an excellent discussion of the
constitutional rights of corporations and their judicial origins, see TED NACE, supra
note 146, at 11-85.
GOERGEN ET AL., supra note 141, at 103. The authors add that "corporations should
be expected to obey the law" to help "foster[] a realistic perspective from which
corporate governance can be expected to improve." Id at 104. The authors note that
their "normative arguments are based on the perspective that a corporation is a social
citizen and should therefore be made accountable for the social externalities that may
ensue from its activities." Id at 46.
Lionel Tiger, The Evolution of Cultural Norms, in THE SENSE OF JUSTICE, supra note
288, at 278, 287; see also FUKUYAMA, supra note 286, at 150 ("Modem institutions
are a necessary but not sufficient condition for modem prosperity and the social well-
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Accountability to jurors will help augment the economic and social
conditions necessary to incentivize and encourage hard-fought but
fair economic competition. 301 As noted by Larry Arnhart: "Frederich
Hayek understood that a free society can minimize coercion by the
state only if there is a high degree of voluntary conformity to moral
rules enforced by social pressure. ,,302 We should therefore stop
seeking to shelter and protect dominant ftrms and monopolies from
exposure to juries.
Adam Smith recognized hundreds of years ago that juries
additionally help "curb[] the power of the judge [s]" and act as a
societal check on judicial power. 303 Juries also add respectability and
authority to our democratic judicial processes. As noted by Third
Circuit Judge Gibbons in his dissenting opinion in In re Japanese
Electronics Products Antitrust Litigation:
In the process of gaining public acceptance for the
imposition of sanctions, the role of the jury is highly

being that it undergirds, they have to be combined with certain traditional social and
ethical habits if they are to work properly.").
301. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives oj Corporate Directors (Or Why You Don't
Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. 1. CORP. L. 1, 1 (2003)
("A variety of factors ... may offer a foundation for building a model of human
behavior that is both more accurate and useful than the homo economicus model. ");
MICHAEL J. COMER, CORPORATE FRAUD 15 (3d ed. 1998) ("Fraud is contagious and
corrosive and if supposedly small frauds are allowed to escape they will soon grow.");
Francesca Gino et aI., Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior: The
Effect oj One Bad Apple on the Barrel, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 393, 398 (2009); Horton,
supra note 12, at 510-14.
302. Larry Arnhart, Darwinian Conservatism, in PHILOSOPHY AFTER DARWIN: CLASSIC
AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 349, 351 (Michael Ruse ed., 2009). Arnhart
continued:
[Hayek] insisted "that freedom has never worked without deeply
ingrained moral beliefs and that coercion can be reduced to a
minimum only where individuals can be expected as a rule to
conform voluntarily to certain principles." Traditional moral rules
arise from the social pressure of public approval or disapproval.
A healthy moral order emerges from the spontaneous order of
civil society that stands between the individual and the state.
Id. (citing FREDERICK HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 62-63, 146-47 (1960».
303. See ADAM SMITH, LECTURE ON JURISPRUDENCE OF MARCH 11, 1763, reprinted in
ADAM SMITH: LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 282, 283 (photo reprint 1982) (R. L.
Meek et aI., eds., 1978). Smith went on to castigate the courts of France, observing
that "we see that the courts at their first institution have allways [sic] taken great
liberties. They are neither tied down by the brieves nor encumbered with a jury." Id.
at 287.

668

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 41

significant. The jury is a sort of ad hoc parliament convened
from the citizenry at large to lend respectability and
authority to the process. Judges are often prone to believe
that they, alone, can bear the full weight of this legitimizing
function. I doubt that they can. Any erosion of citizen
participation in the sanctioning system is in the long run
likely, in my view, to result in a reduction in the moral
authority that supports the process. 304
We live today in a "society in which individualism and
community are precariously joined.,,30s
The Chicago/Harvard
theorists proclaim their utter trust in a free market of consumers. 306
Yet when a representative panel of those consumers is selected as
citizen jurors, the Chicago/Harvard theorists ironically claim that the
panel is incapable of grasping and understanding the complexities of
business and economic competition, which, in the Chicago/Harvard
model, can be fairly understood only by appointed judges. 307 This is
the height of anti-democratic arrogance and folly,308 and it is time to
summarily reject it. By reviving antitrust juries, we can begin the
process of restoring community-based moral authority to the
enforcement of our antitrust laws. 309
304.
305.

306.
307.
308.

309.

In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1093 (3d Cir. 1980)
(Gibbons, 1., dissenting).
ROBERT WESSON, BEYOND NATURAL SELECTION 137 (1991). Francis Fukuyama
further observes that "[b ]oth American democracy and American business have been
successful because they partook of individualism and community simultaneously."
FUKUY AMA, supra note 286, at 308.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part m.B.
Some might go so far as to portray the Chicago/Harvard distrust of juries as part of
"an elitist and at length a fascist rhetoric against free public opinion itself." See
MCCLOSKEY, supra note 215, at 439. Professor McCloskey believes that the principal
seven virtues of prudence, temperance, justice, courage, love, faith, and hope are
crucial to successful long-term innovation. !d. at 443-44. Juries, of course, present a
more representative sampling of these seven virtues than any individual judge.
See Arnhart, supra note 302, at 351 (discussing JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE
(1993». Arnhart examined Wilson's claim that:
[M]any of the most urgent problems in public policy show the
importance of moral character. For example, violent crime is a
problem because a few people lack the self-control and the
sympathy for the feelings of others that keep most people from
becoming violent criminals. Good citizens obey the law because
they have a moral sense that makes them law-abiding. Societies
become disorderly when too many people fail to show the
virtuous traits of good moral character.
!d.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The current ChicagolHarvard antitrust double helix, and its
enthusiastic embrace by the Supreme Court, has led to a shocking
decrease in antitrust enforcement over the last three decades. The
fIrst strand of the double helix has adopted as its mantra the
normative cliche that "the antitrust laws protect competition, not
competitors." This mantra has been lionized far beyond its humble
normative origins to laud and encourage the growth of dominant
fIrms and monopolies while remaining indifferent to the effects of
predatory conduct on competitors. The end result has been a striking
reduction in the enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as well as the Robinson-Patman Act,
over the past three plus decades.
The second strand of the ChicagolHarvard double helix has
essentially counseled us to shield dominant fIrms and monopolies
from antitrust juries through anti-democratic and paternalistic judicial
interventions. The ostensible cover for this reduction of antitrust
plaintiffs' Seventh Amendment jury rights has been the unsupported
assertion that antitrust cases and Chicago/Harvard economic theories
are too complex for jurors. To further buttress their goals, the
Chicago/Harvard theoreticians have convinced the courts to
rationalize and keep away from juries hard-core evidence of
predatory intent.
Applying an evolutionary approach to our antitrust laws and their
enforcement, it is time to unravel and replace the Chicago/Harvard
antitrust double helix. We should substitute its philosophic strands
with base pairs dedicated to guarding competitors against predatory
conduct and aggressive mergers by dominant fIrms and monopolies,
and reviving antitrust jury trials.
In guarding competitors, we need not and should not protect
economically unfit competitors from the rigors of fair competition.
We should, however, eschew the normative cliche that "the antitrust
laws protect competition, not competitors," by reinvigorating and
revitalizing the enforcement of our Sherman and Clayton Acts.
Guarding competitors against predatory conduct and aggressive
mergers will protect the competitive diversity and variety necessary
for a stable, thriving, and innovation-oriented economic ecosystem.
In reviving antitrust jury trials, we will reverse the anti-democratic
shielding of dominant fIrms and monopolies from effective public
oversight, and restore a proper regard for our Seventh Amendment.
As part of this strategy, we should allow antitrust juries to fully
evaluate and assess evidence of dominant firms' and monopolies'
predatory intent in carrying out strategic and exclusionary activities.
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From an evolutionary standpoint, juries are far better-equipped than
judges straitjacketed by ChicagolHarvard economic theories 3!O to
assess and resolve predatory conduct issues.
The ChicagolHarvard antitrust double helix has provided the
philosophical bases for the diminished enforcement of our antitrust
laws for more than thirty years. The overall economic results have
not matched the ChicagolHarvard rhetoric 3!! while the growth of
economic institutions "too big to fail,,3!2 is of grave concern. It is
therefore time to begin basing the interpretation and enforcement of
our antitrust laws upon a new philosophical double helix that will
protect and promote our long-term economic diversity and innovation
opportunities by guarding competitors; and reinvigorate our
community-based morals and ethics by reviving antitrust jury trials.

310.

311.

312.

If Chicago/Harvard economic theories are "too complex" for juries to understand and
apply, the primary reason may be that they do not comport with jurors' common sense
and evolutionary notions of justice and fairness. Nor do such theories represent or
comport with our community-based standards of moral authority. See, e.g., Robert C.
Solomon, Business Ethics, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 354, 358 (Peter Singer ed.,
1991) ("However competitive a particular industry may be, it always rests upon a
foundation of shared interests, and mutually agreed-upon rules of conduct, and the
competition takes place not in a jungle but in a community, which it presumably both
serves and depends upon.").
See ADAMS & BROCK, supra note 145, at 303 ("[W]hen economic performance is
actually examined, we have seen, it casts serious doubt on the assertion that bigness is
the guarantor of operating efficiency, innovation efficiency, or social efficiency. ");
DAVIDSON, supra note 1, at 54, 149-56 (discussing a variety of historical, behavioral,
and game theory reasons why innovation is likely to be reduced in markets that are
more concentrated); ZOLTAN J. Acs & DAVID B. AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND SMALL
FIRMS (1990) ("[C]ontrary to much of the conventional wisdom, innovative activity is
apparently hindered, not promoted, in concentrated markets."); Spencer Weber
Waller, Corporate Governance and Competition Policy, 18 GEO. MASON L. REv. 833,
873-74 (2011) ("[T]here is mounting evidence from corporate fmance communities
that suggests entire categories of deals are more fraught with peril and more likely to
destroy, rather than enhance, shareholder value.
Together, these sources and
studies suggest that certain categories of mergers destroy shareholder value and do
little, if anything, to create meaningful efficiencies or to enhance market
competition. ").
See ADAMS & BROCK, supra note 145; DAVIDSON, supra note 1; LYNN, supra note
146; SORKIN, supra note 142; Foer, supra note 145.

